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5 on secular and radical Buddhism 5
introduction
In a number of  influential  books and articles,  Stephen Batchelor has
proposed,  developed,  and defended something he  has  called  (among
others)  “secular  Buddhism” and “Buddhism 2.0”.1 The idea of  such a
secular  or  scientific  or  naturalistic  or  otherwise  not  traditionally
religious kind of Buddhism isn’t new – it has been especially popular
among 20th and 21st  Western converts to Buddhism, but there have
been Asian precursors as well.2 Nevertheless, the idea is also somewhat
controversial. Adherents of “secular Buddhism” like Batchelor typically
consider  it  a  return  to  the  roots  of  Buddhism  and  to  the  original
teachings  of  the  Buddha,  but  others  –  such as  Donald  Lopez –  have
argued  that  a  secularized  or  “scientific”  Buddhism  would  (have  to)
discard too much doctrine to still be recognizably “Buddhist”.3
1 Books: Stephen Batchelor (1997), Buddhism without Beliefs: A Contemporary
Guide to Awakening (Riverhead);  (2011),  Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist
(Spiegel  &  Grau);  and  especially  (2015),  After  Buddhism:  Rethinking  the
Dharma  for  a  Secular  Age (Yale  University  Press).  Relevant  papers  are
collected in (2018), Secular Buddhism: Imagining the Dharma in an Uncertain
World (Yale University Press).
2 In  the first  half  of  the 20th century there were movements to modernize
Buddhism in almost all Asian countries in which Buddhism is an important
religion.
3 Donald Lopez jr. (2012). The Scientific Buddha: His Short and Happy Life (Yale
University Press).
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I’m not sure whether it is really that interesting to debate whether
secular, scientific, etcetera Buddhisms are really “Buddhist”. I’m inclined
– like many others, by the way – to think of the rather large family of
varieties of “Buddhism” as something like a tree with many branches
coming from the same stem and roots. Any branch or leaf on that tree is
Buddhist in at least some sense. The history of Buddhism is littered with
attempts  to  prune  away  larger  or  smaller  branches  (by  denouncing
them as heretic or “non-Buddhist”), but the tree metaphor illustrates
the futility thereof. If one succeeds in pruning away a branch of an oak
tree, then that separated branch doesn’t cease to be oak. Perhaps, this is
an overly liberal view of what it means to be “Buddhist” – even a leaf
that drops of an oak tree in autumn remains an oak leaf – but I don’t
think  there  is  a  useful  alternative.  There  is  no  single  essence  of
Buddhism  that  any  set  of  ideas  must  include  to  be  considered
“Buddhist”,  for  example.  In  fact,  most  varieties  of  Buddhism  reject
essentialism,  and therefore  –  rather  paradoxically  –  the  rejection of
essences would probably be part of a hypothetical essence of Buddhism,
making that very notion incoherent.
In  any  case,  many  secular,  scientific,  etcetera Buddhisms  are
unambiguously branches (or leaves) of the Buddhist tree. (Exceptions
would  be  philosophies  that  grew  from  different  trees  and  merely
borrowed  some  elements  from  Buddhism.)  Many  other  branches  or
leaves might want to cut them off, but that – again – is futile. They grew
from the tree of Buddhism and remain very much part of it, even if they
differ  significantly  from  many  other  branches.  (And  anyway,  all
branches and leaves differ significantly from the stem and roots.)
I’m not part of  that tree myself,  by the way – I’m a mere curious
observer.  Some  parts  of  the  tree  intrigue  me,  others  I  find  quite
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attractive,  and  yet  others  I  find  just  strange  or  even  repulsive.  For
various  reasons,  I  find  the  idea  of  a  more  or  less  secularized  or
naturalistic  and  more  philosophical  than  religious  Buddhism
particularly interesting,  but I’m not some kind of “secular Buddhist”
either (obviously,  because that would put me on the tree,  and I  just
wrote that I’m not part of the tree). I  have little affinity with recent
Western  secularized  Buddhisms  like  Batchelor’s,  however,  and much
more with some varieties of “radical Buddhism” developed in the 20th
century  in  Japan  and  elsewhere  in  (East)  Asia.  It  seems  to  me  that
“radical  Buddhists”  like  Seno'o  Girō  have  much  more  to  offer  than
“secular Buddhists” like Stephen Batchelor. This article is an attempt to
explain why I think this is the case.
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secular Buddhism
As far as I know, the term “secular Buddhism” was coined in the first
decade of the 21st century. I do not know who coined the term, but it
gained prominence when Stephen Batchelor published an article titled
“A Secular Buddhism” in 2012.4 (He also used the term “Buddhism 2.0”
in that paper to refer to his version of secular Buddhism.) The opening
paragraph of that article explains how Batchelor interprets the term
“secular” and thus what is “secular” about his “secular Buddhism”, and
much  of  the  rest  of  the  paper  is  an  attempt  to  explain  what  is
“Buddhist”  about  his  approach.  What  would  make  “Buddhism  2.0”
Buddhist rather than something else – in Batchelor’s view – is that “it
would . . . be founded upon canonical source texts, be able to offer a
coherent interpretation of key practices, doctrines and ethical precepts,
and provide a sufficiently rich and integrated theoretical model of the
dharma [i.e. Buddhist doctrine] to serve as the basis for a flourishing
human  existence”.5 This  raises  lots  of  questions  about  which  texts
deserve canonical status and why, and which practices, doctrines, and
ethical precepts should be considered essentially Buddhist and which
not, and it seems that there is little agreement among (historical and
4 Stephen Batchelor (2012). “A Secular Buddhism”, Journal of Global Buddhism
13: 87-107. This paper is reprinted in the aforementioned collection (2018).
5 Idem, p. 90.
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current)  schools  of  Buddhism  about  what  the  answers  to  those
questions could be.
The term “secular” is used by Batchelor in three overlapping senses:
(1) to denote a contrast or opposition to what is religious; (2) to refer to
“this  age”,  “this  generation”,  and  “this  world”;  (3)  to  refer  to  the
transfer of authority away from the church(es) and to the declining role
of religion (and religious authority) in people’s lives. The third sense
doesn’t appear to play a major role, but the other two do, and not just in
Batchelor’s “Buddhism 2.0”. Secular, scientific,  etcetera Buddhisms are
non-religious (i.e. sense 1), and purport to be relevant to this age and
this world (i.e. sense 2). A more cynical reading of the second sense of
“secular” is “useful and fashionable”, and there certainly is much to say
for that cynical reading.
the cult of the authentic
One particular way in which secular Buddhisms are fashionable is in
their uncritical acceptance of the modern Western normative ideal of
authenticity. This ideal is rooted in 19th century Romantic thought, but
has more recently become incorporated by capitalism in various ways.
One fashion of authenticity is the misguided (and rather un-Buddhist)
ideal of being authentic,6 but at least equally important is the fashion of
authentic consumption – that is, the attempt by consumers to acquire
and/or  experience  authentic  “things”  (in  the  broadest  possible
6 For an excellent critique of this notion of authenticity and an explanation of
why one should not (usually) strive to be authentic in this sense, see: Simon
Feldman  (2015),  Against  Authenticity:  Why  You  Shouldn’t  Be  Yourself
(London: Lexington).
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interpretation of “thing”).7 Thus, a Western tourist under the influence
of  this  cult  of  authentic  consumption  will  only  want  to  see  and
experience  authentic  buildings  (including authentic  ruins),  authentic
landscapes, authentic cultures, authentic foods, and so forth, and will
reject hybrids and modern and Western influences on (or “corruptions”
of)  the  “pure”,  traditional,  original,  authentic  ideal.  And  similarly,  a
Western  Buddhist  under  the  same  influence  will  want  to  find  –  or
construct (!) – the most “authentic” Buddhism possible and will reject
what she sees as corruptions, deviations, and non-purely-Buddhist (i.e.
“inauthentic”)  influences.  Much Western  Buddhism is  fashionable  in
exactly this sense –  i.e. it  aims to consume some kind of “authentic”
Buddhism – and most secular Buddhisms appear to be especially heavily
influenced  by  the  cult  of  the  authentic.  Typically,  they  aim  to
reconstruct the original teachings of the Buddha, purified from later,
inauthentic corruptions and other “inauthentic” influences.
Authenticity is  a  misguided ideal,  however, and Stephen Batchelor
appears to realize this. He writes that:
The more I am seduced by the force of my own arguments, the
more  I  am  tempted  to  imagine  that  my  secular  version  of
Buddhism  is  what  the  Buddha  originally  taught,  which  the
traditional  schools  have  either  lost  sight  of  or  distorted.  This
would  be  a  mistake;  for  it  is  impossible  to  read  the  historical
7 For an useful review of the sociology of such authentic consumption, see:
Amanda Koontz (2009), “Constructing Authenticity: A Review of Trends and
Influences  in  the  Process  of  Authentication  in  Consumption”,  Sociology
Compass 4.11: 977-988.
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Buddha’s  mind  in  order  to  know  what  he  “really”  meant  or
intended.8
However,  it  also  seems  that  the  seductive  force  of  the  ideal  of
authenticity  is  strong,  as much of Batchelor’s  work is  an attempt to
reconstruct  the  life  and  original  (i.e. authentic)  teachings  of  the
Buddha.9 And  arguably,  that  is  also  the  most  interesting  part  of  his
work.10 Nevertheless,  Batchelor  is  right  that  authenticity  is
unachievable –  we cannot  “read the historical  Buddha’s  mind”.  It  is,
perhaps, worth noting here that in the pre-twentieth century Buddhist
tradition no one ever tried either. The whole idea of reconstructing the
historical Buddha and his “real” historical message is alien to Buddhism
and even clashes with widely held Buddhist beliefs about (historical)
factuality.11 So, in a sense, the reconstructionist project appears to be a
very “un-Buddhist” project.12
A more important question than whether reconstruction is possible
or properly “Buddhist” is whether authenticity is – or should be – an
ideal at all. Authentic ruins may be more interesting to visit than fake
8 Batchelor (2012). “A Secular Buddhism”, p. 90.
9 Or in his own words, he seeks “to return to the roots of the tradition and
rethink and rearticulate the dharma anew”. (2015, After Buddhism, p. 19)
10 Scattered  throughout  his  (2011)  and  (2015)  books  is  a  biography  of  the
Buddha  that  is  considerably  more  plausible  and  better  researched  than
anything else I’ve read about the topic, for example, and I’d love to see a
book that integrates those parts into an annotated, critical biography of the
Buddha.
11 See: Jan Westerhoff (2018), The Golden Age of Buddhist Philosophy (Oxford
University Press): pp. 24-34.
12 See also the section titled “reality and compassion” below.
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ruins,  but  Buddhism  is  not  like  a  ruined  building  –  rather,  it  is  a
collection of values, beliefs, and ideas that serves certain purposes and
there is no a priori reason to assume that a more “authentic” version of
those values,  beliefs,  and ideas serve those purposes any better than
less  authentic  versions.  Actually,  the  contrary  is  considerably  more
plausible.  Thales  is  arguably  the  father  of  Western  science  and
philosophy.  If  authentic  beliefs  would  be  more  valuable  than  later
“corruptions”, then we should reject Newton, Einstein, and everything
modern  science  (and  philosophy)  has  taught  and  return  to  Thales’s
original teachings. For example, we’d have to reject plate tectonics and
explain earthquakes by claiming that land floats on water.
As mentioned, one of the most interesting parts of Batchelor’s work is
his  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  life  and  teachings  of  the  historical
Buddha.  The  story  he  tells  is  convincing,  but  the  more  human  the
Buddha becomes, the more he becomes like Thales. That is, he becomes
the father of a certain tradition, but nothing more than that. 13 Being
just human, the Buddha no longer has any special authority and there
is,  therefore,  no  special  reason  to  believe  his  teachings.14 In  other
13 To me personally, the historical Buddha indeed is not much more than that:
like Thales, he founded a tradition, but he is mainly of historical interest and
not  much  more  essential  or  important  to  the  tradition  he  founded  than
Thales  is  to  modern  science  and  philosophy.  (It  is  also  partially  for  this
reason that I'm not quoting any of the alleged sayings of the “historical”
Buddha.)
14 Destroying the last bit  of authority the Buddha has after humanizing him,
Stephen Batchelor remarks that the Buddha “did not stand out among his
peers  because his  knowledge of  reality  was somehow more accurate or
superior to theirs” (2015,  After Buddhism, p.  129).  Oddly,  Batchelor doesn’t
seem to realize  how devastating this  remark  is,  but  if  there was nothing
special about the Buddha, then there is no reason whatsoever to accept his
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words, the more authentic the reconstruction of the Buddha’s teachings
and their  origins,  the  less  reason there  is  to  accept  them.  The  only
reason there would be to  accept  the teachings  of  a  fully  humanized
Buddha is that (there is sufficient evidence that) they are true or that
they “work”. Batchelor himself adopts a kind of vulgar Pragmatism that
confuses the notion of truth with the criteria to assign truth status (i.e.
justification –  see:  Some  Remarks  on  Truth and  Justification@) and thus
more or less fuses the two notions,15 but that matters little here. What
does matter is that acceptance of some theory or idea (regardless of
whether it is supposed to be true or that it “works”) should depend on
nothing but  evidence – the source or author of that theory or idea is
utterly  irrelevant.  Consequently,  the  ideal  of  authenticity  is  self-
undermining: the authentic Buddha has no authority.
There  is,  furthermore,  something  unpleasantly  arrogant  and
condescending about the search for the “true” teaching of the “true”
Buddha because that search always involves an implicit devaluation and
rejection  of  everything  that  doesn’t  satisfy  the  implied  standard  of
purity.  I  already  mentioned  above  that  there  is  a  long  tradition  of
accusations of corruption of the “true” teaching within Buddhism. In
terms of the tree metaphor adopted above, this is like one branch or
leaf  of  the  same  tree  accusing  another  branch  or  leaf  of  being  an
aberration and not really belonging to the same tree. This is somewhat
absurd, of course, but it becomes especially absurd – and, as mentioned,
teachings,  unless they would satisfy scientific  standards.  But  they cannot
possibly satisfy criteria for good scientific theory, as they aren’t rooted in
(and possibly are not even coherent with) a scientific world view.
@ http://www.lajosbrons.net/blog/some-remarks-on-truth-and-justification/
15 Batchelor (2011), Confessions of a Buddhist Atheist, p. 199.
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unpleasantly  arrogant  and  condescending  –  in  case  of  secular
Buddhism,  even  if  the  rejection  of  the  “untrue”  or  “inauthentic”
branches  is  often  left  unmentioned.  Western,  secular  Buddhisms
typically  do not  originate  from within the Buddhist  tradition,  so  in a
sense, they are more like something – a fungus, perhaps – growing on
the tree than like a part of the tree itself. The cult of authenticity then,
is like a fungus that grows on or near the roots of the tree and that
considers  itself  to  be  a  more  authentic  part  of  the  tree  than  the
branches and leaves, just because it is closer to the roots.16
This latter point is relatively superficial in comparison to the much
more fundamental issue mentioned before. An attempt to go back to the
authentic teachings of the Buddha makes sense only if one accepts that
the Buddha had some special, supernatural access to truth and wisdom,
much like Mohamed’s direct line of communication with Allah, but a
secular Buddhist  cannot  possibly  accept  that.  For  a  genuinely secular
Buddhist, the Buddha is merely of historical interest, and authenticity is
not a normative ideal. If anything, a secular Buddhist should appreciate
the results of centuries of open debate on doctrine much more than the
sketchy ideas that started that debate (although it  must be admitted
immediately  that  open debate  about  doctrine  has  only  occurred
16 I  wonder  whether  the cult  of  the authentic  is  reinforced by the fact  that
Western,  secular Buddhists come from the outside.  Perhaps,  the fanatical
search  for  authenticity  or  purity  is  compensation  for  the  outsider  status
(which appears to be a rather common phenomena – outsiders are often the
fiercest purists). Perhaps, it is an elaborate attempt to suppress some kind of
inferiority  complex  by  reinventing  and  elevating  one’s  own  “Buddhist”
credentials and simultaneously undermining the credentials of two and half
millennia of Buddhists and Buddhism in Asia.
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sporadically  and  has  mostly  been  overshadowed  by  sectarian  or
scholastic dogma).
purification beyond the authentic
Some  secular  Buddhists  aim to  go  further  even  than  reconstructing
something as close as possible to the Buddha’s original teachings – they
want to purify those teachings from non-Buddhist influences as well.
Hence,  they  aim  for  something  that  is  explicitly  unauthentic,  for
something  more  “pure”  than  (historical)  reality.  Stephen  Batchelor
adopts  a  variant  of  this  attitude,  for  example.  He  writes  that  “my
starting  point  in  dealing  with  dogmatic  statements  is  to  bracket  off
anything attributed to Gotama that could just as well have been said by
another wanderer, Jain monk, or brahmin priest of the same period”.17
In his  Buddhism as Philosophy, Mark Siderits suggests something like
this as a possibility as well, but more as a theoretical exercise than as a
normative ideal.18 A charitable reading of Batchelor suggests that his
approach should be understood much in the same way – his point in
“bracketing off” is  not so  much hyper-purification,  but  arriving at  a
more  interesting  theory.  And  many  other  secular  (and  radical)
Buddhisms “bracket off” ideas on similar grounds.
There is a long list of candidate ideas that could be “bracketed off” on
these grounds (i.e. on the grounds that they were part of the shared
cultural background rather than particular to the Buddha’s thought).
An obvious example is reincarnation or rebirth (suggested by Siderits).
17 Batchelor (2015), After Buddhism, p. 26.
18 Mark Siderits (2007). Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction (Ashgate).
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Mind/body  dualism  (and  other  varieties  of  substance  dualism)  is
another example. The belief  in gods and spirits;  the theory of  karma
(which is, of course, closely related to the idea of rebirth); and so forth.
One may wonder, however, how many of such background ideas can be
discarded without changing Buddhism into something else entirely.19 In
any  case,  much  of  Buddhist  doctrine  would  have  to  be  radically
rethought. Batchelor, of course, realizes this very well and much of his
project is aimed at doing exactly that.
A  potential  problem,  however,  is  that  this  “bracketing  off”  of
problematic  ideas  may  clash  more  violently  with  the  attempt  to
reconstruct the historical Buddha than Batchelor and fellow travelers
seem to realize. Again, the idea is to discard anything that clashes with
the  secular  worldview  and that  was  part  of  the  common  or  shared
intellectual background, but there may not be much in that category.
Problematic  ideas  such  as  the  theories  of  karma and  rebirth  (or
reincarnation)  where  not universally  accepted  in  the  time  of  the
Buddha.20 They were widely shared, but also debated, and they were
rejected by the Cārvāka school, for example. Furthermore, they were
explicitly endorsed by the Buddha. Hence, the ideas that some secular
Buddhists want to “bracket off” were more or less controversial ideas
that were explicitly part of the Buddha’s teachings. One can still choose
to bracket off those ideas, of course, but one cannot honestly pretend
that the result is still the authentic teaching of the historical Buddha.
19 Lopez (2012). The Scientific Buddha.
20 They may not even have been part of the pre-Brahmanic (and pre-Buddhist)
worldview of the historical Buddha’s people.
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useful and fashionable
The ideal of authenticity is not the only thing that is fashionable about
secular  Buddhism.  Stephen  Batchelor’s  second  sense  of  “secular”
focuses  on  “saeculum”  as  referring  to  this  age,  this  world,  and  this
generation.21 His point is that secular Buddhism should be relevant or
useful  in  this world  and  to  this  generation.  This  is,  of  course,  an
extremely  fashionable  idea  –  in  modern,  capitalist  consumer  society
what  is  useless  is  worthless  –  although  the  extent  of  fashionability
depends on how exactly secular Buddhism is supposed to be useful.
There are two features of modern culture that are especially relevant
here.  Firstly,  modern  culture  is  extremely  individualistic  or  even
narcissistic.22 And secondly, since the 19th century “useful” has become
inseparable from the originally utilitarian concept of “utility”,  which
itself  –  under  the  influence  of  the  hegemony  of  liberalism  and
mainstream  economics  –  has  effectively  turned  into  a  synonym  of
“profitability”.  Hence,  something  is  useful  to  the  extent  that  it  is
profitable. There are many ways in which something can be profitable,
however. It might help you make more money directly. Or it might help
you cope with the conditions of life more effectively. Or it may help in
creating acceptance of the status quo (i.e. hegemony) and thereby make
your employees less likely to dissent or revolt. And so forth.
Stephen  Batchelor  states  explicitly  that  he  does  “not  envision  a
Buddhism that  seeks  to  discard all  trace of  religiosity,  that  seeks  to
21 Batchelor (2012), “A Secular Buddhism”, p. 87. (2015), After Buddhism, p. 16.
22 Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell (2009).  The Narcissism Epidemic:
Living in the Age of Entitlement (New York: Atria).
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arrive at a dharma that is little more than a set of self-help techniques
that  enable  us  to  operate  more  calmly  and  effectively  as  agents  or
clients,  or  both,  of  capitalist  consumerism”.23 However,  one  may
wonder how successful he is. His re-interpretation of the dharma (i.e.
Buddhism) is  thoroughly  individualist  (and thus,  very fashionable  in
that  sense,  at  least).  For  example,  item 7  of  his  Ten theses  of  secular
dharma is  that  “the  community  of  practitioners  is  formed  of
autonomous  persons  who  mutually  support  each  other  in  the
cultivation of their paths. In this network of like-minded individuals,
members  respect  the  equality  of  all  members  while  honoring  the
specific  knowledge  and  expertise  each  person  brings”.24 The  same
individualism permeates his rethinking of the doctrine of “no-self”,25
emphasis on self-reliance,26 and response to social ills.27 The “secular
dharma” may be “grounded in a deeply felt concern and compassion for
the  suffering  of  all  those  with  whom  we  share  this  earth”,28 but  it
remains  focused  on  the  practice  of  autonomous  individuals.  As  in
liberalism and mainstream economics, the individual takes center stage
and  is  the  only  actor  worth  considering.  This  is,  of  course,  very
fashionable, but it also denies the “secular dharma” a social or political
role, which makes it rather useful for those who profit from the status
quo  as  well.  Individualistic  concern  with  suffering  without  social,
23 Batchelor (2015), After Buddhism, p. 17.
24 Idem, p. 321.
25 Idem, pp. 201-3.
26 E.g. idem, p. 275.
27 E.g. idem, p. 305.
28 Idem, p. 16.
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communal, and political action to alleviate that suffering is impotent
and harmless to those who profit from the continuation of suffering.29
In  the  end,  what  most  secular  Buddhisms  achieve  is  a  kind  of
acceptance  of  suffering,  rather  than  a  desire  to  end it.  Individualist
Buddhism is aimed at changing oneself rather than changing the world.
Almost  as  an  afterthought,  Batchelor’s  8th  Thesis  of  secular  dharma
preaches “empathy, compassion, and love for all creatures who have
evolved on this earth”,30 but just sharing in others’ suffering (that is
what  “compassion”  means)  is  insufficient  –  without  a  serious
commitment  to  change  the  world  (rather  than  just  oneself)  this  so-
called  “empathy”  or  “compassion”  is  nothing  but  a  pornographic
indulging in pity.31
Buddhism has always been made useful, of course, and being useful is
not  objectionable  in  itself.  The  issue  here  is  not  whether  secular
Buddhism  is  useful,  however,  but  whether  it  is  fashionable,  which
includes a  certain kind of usefulness. As mentioned, Batchelor rejects a
reduction of  secular  Buddhism to “a  set  of  self-help techniques that
enable us to operate more calmly and effectively as agents or clients, or
both, of capitalist consumerism”,32 but he is also rather apologetic of
“Buddhist” practices that are exactly that. Furthermore, he points out
that it has always been like this: to a large extent Buddhism has always
29 The failure of secular Buddhism to be (much) more than self-help is also
illustrated by its most common defense by adherents when facing criticism:
“it works for me”. That’s apparently all that matters: that it “works” for “me”
in better coping with the stresses caused by this world.
30 Idem, p. 321.
31 I’ll return to this issue in the “concluding remarks” at the end of this article.
32 Batchelor (2015), After Buddhism, p. 17.
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been “dumbed down” to a kind of self-help techniques that enable the
adherent  “to operate  more calmly  and effectively”  in  the  world she
happens to be born in.
An oft-heard complaint among traditional Buddhists is that the
mindfulness movement is a “dumbing down” of the dharma. This
elitist  objection  fails  to  recognize  that  Buddhism  has  been
dumbing itself down ever since it began. It is doubtful that those
who condemn the mindfulness movement on such grounds would
likewise  condemn  the  practice  of  millions  of  Buddhists  that
consists  in  repeating  over  and  over  again  the  name  of  the
mythical  Buddha  Amitabha  or  the  title  of  the  Lotus  Sūtra.
Mindfulness  is  becoming  the  Om  Mani  Padme  Hum of  secular
Buddhism. Instead of mumbling a mantra while spinning a prayer
wheel  and once a  week going to the monastery to  light  butter
lamps,  modern  practitioners  may  sit  on  a  cushion  for  twenty
minutes a day observing their breathing and once a week attend a
“sitting  group”  in  a  friend’s  living  room.  In  both  cases,  those
involved may have little understanding of Buddhist philosophy or
doctrine  but  find  these  simple  exercises  rewarding  in  helping
them live balanced and meaningful lives.33
In a sense, Buddhism has always been “secular”. It has always been
adapted  to  the  circumstances  of  the  time  and  place  where  it  was
practiced. Lay Buddhism has always been a “dumbed down” tool to help
people cope with their situation and the suffering around them. (And
monastic  or  institutional  Buddhism  has  almost  always  functioned
primarily  to  serve  that  lay  application  and/or  the  state.)  However,
33 Batchelor (2015), After Buddhism, p. 258.
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while adopting and incorporating cultural practices and fashions may
be  an  effective  way  to  make  a  body  of  ideas  more  acceptable  and
“useful” in some age and context,  this doesn’t  automatically make it
“better” in any sense of that term. Being “secular” (or fashionable) in
this sense is not a normative ideal. In the contrary, I’m inclined to say
that  by  implicitly  adopting the narcissistic  individualism of  our  age,
secular  Buddhism  only  diminishes  Buddhism.  Adopting  bad  fashions
makes something worse, not better.
the secular and the religious
The  secular  contrasts  with  the  religious,  and  consequently,  to
understand  what  it  means  to  be  secular  (in  this  contrastive  sense)
requires  an  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  be  religious.
Unfortunately, there is no single uncontroversial definition of religion.
Religions consist of a wold view and a life view. (Or  Weltanschauung
and Lebensanschauung in German. Unfortunately, English doesn’t have a
good translation of the second term. “Life view” is a literal translation
and is consistent with the translation of the first term as “world view”.)
A world view is a collection of ideas about how the world works, about
what exists and what doesn’t, and so forth. A life view is a collection of
ideas about the meaning of life, about right and wrong, and so forth.
Obviously,  defining  religion  as  world  view  plus life  view  is
insufficient, because (some of) the sciences and part of philosophy34 are
also collections of  ideas about how the world works and about what
exists. Those, however, are usually considered to constitute a secular,
34 Metaphysics and other branches of theoretical philosophy particularly.
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rather than religious world view (although there is a lot of religiously
based philosophy, of course). And ideas about the meaning of life and
about right and wrong also belong to philosophy.35 So, the question is,
What exactly distinguishes a religious world+life view from a secular
world+life  view?  It  seems  to  me  that  the  answer  to  that  question
consists of two parts – one metaphysical and one epistemological.
Firstly, religious world+life views appeal to the supernatural,  while
secular  world+life  views  do  not.  Or  in  other  words,  religion  is
supernaturalist  and  secularity  is  naturalist.  This  is  a  metaphysical
difference  between  religion  and  secular  world+life  views.  Religious
views contend that  supernatural  agents,  forces,  causes,  and so  forth
exist,  and  thus  that  there  are  supernatural  explanations.
Secular/naturalist  views  reject  that  idea  –  there  is  nothing  beyond
physical nature/reality.
Secondly, it is often claimed that religion is dogmatic while secularity
is not, but that is not exactly true. Religious “dogmas” also change over
time,  and more or  less  dogmatic thought  also occurs  in science  and
philosophy.  The  real  difference  between  the  two  kinds  of  views  is
epistemological: it concerns the status of revelation and certain kinds of
testimony  as  sources  of  knowledge.  Revelation  is  knowledge  with  a
supernatural origin (like the knowledge Mohamed and other prophets
received from God directly). Testimony is “second-hand knowledge” –
things you read in books or heard from others. Religions recognize a
special class of texts or stories (i.e. oral transmissions) that qualify as
sources  of  knowledge.  Examples  include  the  Bible,  the  Quran,  and
various Sūtras. Hence, what distinguishes religion from secularity (in
35 Ethics and other branches of practical philosophy particularly.
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addition to the previous point) is that the former recognizes revelation
and/or specific testimony as sources of knowledge, while the latter does
not.
It is often claimed that Buddhism is compatible with secularity in the
metaphysical sense. That is, supposedly Buddhism is atheist and does
not  depend  on  supernatural  explanations.  This  is  not  exactly  right,
however. Most varieties of  Buddhism – along with  all other religious
world+life views – adopt substance dualism (or sometimes a variety of
idealism). Substance dualism holds that there are minds and bodies and
those  two  are  different  kinds  of  substances.  This  kind  of  dualism
contrasts  with  monism  that  holds  that  either  only  the
material/physical  exists,  and  thus  the  mind  is  a  material/physical
process (in  the brain),  or  that  only the mental  exists,  and thus that
apparent physical/material reality is just in the mind. (The latter view
is  called  idealism  and  appears  to  be  adopted  by  some  varieties  of
Buddhism  such  as  Yogācāra.)  Substance  dualism  is  an  untenable
position,  however.  It  conflicts  with  the  laws  of  physics  (the
preservation  laws  of  matter/energy,  particularly)  and  it  makes  the
supposed  interaction  between  the  material  and  the  mental
incomprehensible.36 The  only  way  to  make  sense  of  the  notion  of
mental substances is by making the mind a supernatural category, and
consequently, world+life views that hold that minds are not (reducible
to,  emergent  from,  or  identical  with)  physical/material  things/
processes are supernaturalist, and therefore, religious.
36 See any good introduction to the philosophy of mind for further details on
the problems of  substance dualism (or  Cartesian  dualism),  and why it  is
rejected by virtually every philosopher nowadays.
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However,  giving up on substance dualism (and/or  idealism) would
lead to some other big changes as well. Without mental substances and
related supernaturalities, it is impossible to make sense of  karma and
rebirth  or  reincarnation,  for  example.37 As  mentioned  above,  some
secular  Buddhists  don’t  find  this  objectionable,  because  those  ideas
were – supposedly – part of the shared background in which Buddhism
developed and are, therefore, not an “authentic” part of Buddhism. But
many other core ideas of Buddhism – its understanding of suffering (i.e.
dukkha),  the twelve-linked chain of causes, and so forth – are deeply
influenced  by,  or  even  dependent  on,  these  notions.  There  are,  of
course, many other Buddhist ideas that do not depend on supernatural
assumptions,  but  one may wonder  whether  cutting away everything
that doesn’t satisfy the criterion of secularity – if possible at all – would
leave enough to recognize that remainder as “Buddhist”.38
Furthermore,  it  is  also debatable whether most secular Buddhisms
are  really  secular  in  the  epistemological  sense  mentioned  above.  Of
course, they don’t recognize revelation as a source of knowledge, but
they  invariable  give  special  status  to  certain  kinds  of  testimony  –
namely, the parts of the Pali canon or other texts that they believe to
most accurately capture the Buddha’s original teaching. That teaching
is more or less accepted as true and exempt from rejection. (That is, it
may be reinterpreted, but it can never be rejected.)
37 Furthermore,  the  theory  of  karma also  depends on a  notion  of  free  will
similar (or identical) to metaphysical libertarianism, and that notion can be
made sense of only by means of supernatural explanations as well.
38 As mentioned above,  Donald Lopez,  for  example,  argues that  it  wouldn’t.
(Lopez (2012).  The Scientific Buddha.) And Jan Westerhoff made a similar
point. (Westerhoff (2018), The Golden Age of Buddhist Philosophy.)
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In  science  and  philosophy  (and  thus  in  “secularity”)  views  are
adopted  provisionally  –  at  least  in  theory.  Thus  a  philosopher  may
consider  herself  a  Quinean,  for  example,  meaning  that  she  largely
agrees with the philosophy of W.V.O. Quine. But if she would find solid
evidence and/or valid arguments against most of Quine’s theories that
she considers important, then she might still continue studying Quine,
but she wouldn’t  consider  herself  a  Quinean anymore.  By analogy,  a
(real)  secular  Buddhist  accepts  a  significant  portion  of  Buddhist
teachings provisionally, recognizing that counter-argument and counter-
evidence may lead her to the rejection of those theories.
This, however, is contrary to the very purpose of religion. Religious
world+life  views are not  supposed to change fundamentally  or to be
open to refutation and rejection, because – as Ernest Becker has argued
in The Denial of Death – people need these world+life views to provide a
more  or  less  fixed  ground  for  stable  self-identities  and  to
(unconsciously)  manage their  fear  of  death.39 Secularity  can provide
such  a  fixed ground,  as  the  secular  world  view (i.e. the  rejection  of
supernatural forces and explanations,  and the rejection of revelation
and a special class of testimony – see above) itself may effectively be
(more or less) exempt from scrutiny and rejection. But the same cannot
be true for  something that  is  combined with secularity  –  a consistent
secular  view  trumps  anything  else.  Consequently,  a  (real)  secular
Buddhism is essentially secular, and merely provisionally Buddhist.
However,  religious  terms  of  identification  are  almost  never
understood  as  being  provisional,  and  this  makes  the  term  “secular
Buddhist”  somewhat  misleading.  That  is,  “secular  Buddhist”  is  most
39 Ernest Becker (1973). The Denial of Death (New York: Simon & Schuster).
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likely  to  be  understood  as  essentially  Buddhist  and  provisionally
secular, but that is an impossible position because provisional secularity
is incoherent. For this reason it is debatable whether there is something
that  can  be  appropriately  called  “secular  Buddhism”.  There  may  be
secular world+life views that take inspiration from Buddhism or that
(provisionally)  borrow  Buddhist  ideas  and  hypotheses,  but  that’s
(almost certainly) not enough to classify as “Buddhist”.
Now, it can be argued, of course, that the term “Buddhist” shouldn’t
be interpreted religiously – parallel to Hindu, Muslim, or Christian, for
example  –  because  Buddhism is  as  much a  philosophy as  a  religion.
“Secular Buddhist” would then be more similar to “secular Hegelian”
(i.e. a secular world+life view combined with a provisional acceptance of
key  parts  of  Hegel’s  philosophy)  than  to  “secular  Christian”.  This  is
sophistry,  however,  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  outside  philosophy
departments  almost  no  one  thinks  of  Buddhism  as  a  philosophy.
“Buddhist” is a religious label; not a philosophical one. And secondly,
the  (usually  reverent)  attitude  secular  Buddhists  take  towards  the
Buddha and his teachings (or their interpretation thereof) is religious
more than secular (by the standards explained above), and the same is
true  of  the  reasons  and motivations  for  secular  Buddhism to  accept
some  kind  of  Buddhism  in  the  first  place.  Ultimately,  “secular
Buddhism” is an attempt to construct some purified (“authentic”) form
of Buddhism, and not a kind of secularity with (provisional) Buddhist
influences.
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unfashionable and uncomfortable
The preceding sections may have given the impression that I somehow
oppose secular Buddhism, but that’s not exactly the case.40 There are
many currents of Buddhism that I find interesting because of the role
they  played  in  the  intellectual  history  of  Asia,  for  example,  or  for
sociological reasons, or because they advocated philosophical ideas that
I find intriguing or wise, or for other – generally somewhat academic –
reasons. Japanese Pure Land Buddhism, for example, is interesting for
the way it “democratized” Buddhism (i.e. making Buddhism less elitist),
but at the same time I see no merit in Pure Land Buddhism as a belief
system or philosophy. Something similar applies to secular Buddhism –
I  find the phenomenon interesting mostly for  sociological  and other
reasons, but I see no merit in secular Buddhism as a belief system. What
I  find  most  interesting  about  secular  Buddhism  is  its  uncritical  ( i.e.
unconscious)  adoption  of  currently  fashionable  narcissistic
individualism. I see secular Buddhism as an attempt to soften what I
called  “cultural  psychopathy”  elsewhere,41 but  without  giving  it  up
completely  because  it  is  firmly  in  the  clutches  of  the  hegemony  of
psychopathy.  But  this  is  more  or  less  what  secularity  in  the  second
sense distinguished by Batchelor means: acceptance of the cultural (and
40 But see the “concluding remarks” at the end of this article.
41 Lajos  Brons  (2017).  The  Hegemony  of  Psychopathy (Santa  Barbara:
Brainstorm).
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thus  hegemonic)  status  quo.  While  I  find  this  interesting  from  a
sociological  point  of  view,  it  is  far  removed  from  what  attracts  me
personally  in Buddhism, and even further from my attitude towards
narcissistic individualism or cultural psychopathy. If secularity implies
implicit acceptance of the cultural status quo, I’d prefer some kind of
anti-secular and unfashionable Buddhism.
As  mentioned  above,  Stephen  Batchelor  writes  that  he  does  “not
envision a Buddhism that seeks to discard all trace of religiosity, that
seeks to arrive at a dharma that is little more than a set of self-help
techniques that  enable us to operate more  calmly  and effectively  as
agents or clients, or both, of capitalist consumerism”.42 However, I have
a hard time seeing secular Buddhisms as anything else than just that.
Effectively,  they are nothing but collections of  practices centered on
(mindfulness) meditation allowing individuals to better cope with the
stresses of everyday life in modern capitalist society. From a historical
perspective this is simultaneously somewhat appropriate and peculiar.
It is appropriate for the reason already mentioned by Batchelor in the
long  block  quote  above:  Buddhism  (as  well  as  other  religions)  has
always been simplified to offer comfort to lay believers. It is peculiar,
however,  because mediation never  played that  role.  Meditation does
not play a central  role  in all  branches of  Buddhism, and in those in
which it is important, it is usually just monks (and nuns) who meditate.
And  most  importantly,  as  Donald  Lopez  has  also  pointed  out,43
meditation in Buddhism is more often intended to evoke stress than to
relief stress.
42 Batchelor (2015), After Buddhism, p. 17.
43 Lopez (2012). The Scientific Buddha.
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In the Visuddhimagga,44 one of the most influential texts in Theravāda
Buddhism,  Buddhaghosa  writes  that  two  kinds  of  meditation  are
essential.  Those  two kinds  are meditation on loving-kindness (mettā)
and on death.  In  the  section  on  death as  a  meditation subject,45 he
writes that meditation on death is successful only if it leads to a state of
shock  called  “saṃvega”.46 The  point  of  this  kind  of  –  supposedly
essential – meditation is shock and stress (which should in turn lead to
moral and religious motivation47)  rather than to tranquility or stress
relief.
Buddhaghossa’s second kind of essential meditation isn’t much more
fashionable  either.  The  point  of  meditation  on  loving-kindness  is  to
come to  identify  with others  needs  and interests  as  strongly  as one
would normally identify with one’s own. It is the very antithesis of the
narcissistic  individualism  and  pathological  selfishness  (i.e. cultural
psychopathy) that permeates modern society.  Mindfulness and other
kinds  of  meditation  in  secular  Buddhism  are  primarily  aimed  at
improving  one’s  own  happiness  or  strengthening  one’s  own  coping
mechanism. (And compassion is a mere afterthought – see above.) But
this gets things completely the wrong way around.
The chapter on meditation in Śāntideva’s  Bodhicaryāvatāra, which is
at least as influential in Mahāyāna Buddhism as Buddhaghossa’s text in
44 Buddhaghosa.  The  Path  of  Purification (Visuddhimagga).  Translated  by
Bhikkhu Nyanamoli (Onalaska: bps Pariyatti, 1999).
45 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, VIII.1–41.
46 See also: Lajos Brons (2016). “Facing Death from a Safe Distance: Saṃvega
and Moral Psychology”, Journal of Buddhist Ethics 23: 83–128.
47 See: Brons (2016), “Facing Death from a Safe Distance”, for an explanation of
how and why this could work.
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the  other  main  current,  also  suggests  that  the  main  purpose  of
meditation is to identify with other’s needs and interest. Śāntideva calls
this “the exchange of self and other”.48 But Śāntideva also makes a key
point  that  secular  Buddhism  and  the  mindfulness  movement
conveniently  ignore:  “When  happiness  is  liked  by  me  and  others
equally, what is so special about me that I strive after happiness only
for  myself?”49 The  narcissistic  (and  culturally  dominant)  answer  to
Śāntideva’s  (rhetorical)  question  is  to  just  simply  assume  that  I  am
special, but the fact is that I’m not special, and neither are you. You and
me are just some random ignorant fools who have no greater title to
happiness  than  anyone  else.  And  someone  who  calls  themselves  a
“Buddhist”,  but  consistently  prioritizes  their  own  happiness,
completely misses the point.50
So,  while  I’m  sympathetic  to  the  general  idea  of  a  “secular
Buddhism”,  there  are  facets  of  the  concept  of  the  “secular”  (in  this
context, but perhaps also in other contexts) that I find problematic at
best. I  have no gripes with “secular” as far as that concept contrasts
with  “religious”  or  “supernatural”  (i.e. “secular”  as  some  king  of
shorthand for “naturalist in metaphysics and epistemology”), although
this aspect of secularity would override anything that is combined with
it,  making  the  very  notion  of  “secular  Buddhism”  unstable  or  even
incoherent (see above). Neither do I object to the idea that Buddhism
should somehow be made relevant or useful  to this age or  saeculum,
48 Śāntideva.  Bodhicaryāvatāra. Translated by Kate Crosby & Andrew Skilton
(Oxford University Press, 1995). 8:120.
49 Idem, 8:95.
50 Or at least, it misses what I consider to be a central point (if not the central
point) of Buddhism.
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although I think it should be “relevant” or “useful” by its own standards
rather than by current cultural-political fashions.
What I most object to – but that should be clear already – is secularity
as (implicit) fashionability: particularly the cult of authenticity and the
uncritical  (or  unconscious)  acceptance  of  hegemonic  narcissistic
individualism. Again,  authenticity is  not a normative ideal.  Bodies of
thought develop and evolve and the root of a tree is not in any way
“better”,  “truer”,  or more real  than the leaves.  Knowledge builds up
over  time,  but  the  cult  of  authenticity  assumes  it  is  the  other  way
around:  since  the  mythical  starting  point  there  just  has  been
deterioration.  That  is  a  nonsensical  idea,  however.  Like  any  other
philosophy  or  theory,  Buddhism  developed  in  response  to  criticism,
opposition, new ideas, and new inventions. The Buddha knew much less
than some of  his  later  followers,  and certainly  much less  about  the
modern world. And consequently, rather than trying to dig down to the
roots,  it  may  be  more  useful  to  take  more  than  two  millennia  of
Buddhist  philosophy  in  India,  Sri  Lanka,  Tibet,  China,  Japan,  and
elsewhere seriously.
Most philosophical development took place in the Mahāyāna branch
of  Buddhism,  and  consequently,  giving  up  the  mistaken  ideal  of
authenticity  corrects  another  flaw  of  “secular  Buddhism”  –  that  is,
while in Western secular Buddhisms compassion is a mere afterthought
and the focus is  always one’s  own individual well-being,  compassion
takes center stage in Mahāyāna. And because of that, Mahāyāna may be
the right antidote against the fashionable narcissistic individualism that
has  been  (unconsciously?)  adopted  by  secular  Buddhists  (and  most
other Western Buddhisms).
32 on secular and radical Buddhism 32
Furthermore,  secularized  or  modernized  versions  of  Mahāyāna
Buddhism  have  been  proposed  (and  to  greater  or  lesser  extent
developed) in Asia for well over a century. Interesting examples include
Taixu in China,51 Gendun Chopel in Tibet,52 Han Yongun in Korea,53, and
Uchiyama Gudō and Seno'o Girō in Japan.54 The last two of these – as
well  as  several  unmentioned others  –  have been grouped under  the
header  of  “radical  Buddhism”  by  James  Mark  Shields  and  Patrice
Ladwig.55 They define the notion of “radical” in “radical Buddhism” as a
51 Don Pittman (2001).  Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu’s Reforms
(Honolulu:  University  of  Hawai‘i  Press).  Justin  Ritzinger  (2914).  “The
Awakening  of  Faith  in  Anarchism:  A  Forgotten  Chapter  in  the  Chinese
Buddhist Encounter with Modernity”,  Politics, Religion & Ideology 15.2: 224-
243.
52 Donald Lopez (2005).  The Madman’s Middle Way: Reflections on Reality of
the Tibetan Monk Gendun Chopel (University of Chicago Press).
53 Han  Yongun  (2008).  Selected  Writings  of  Han  Yongun:  From  Social
Darwinism to ‘Socialism with a Buddhist Face’ (Global Oriental).
54 Fabio Rambelli (2013). Zen Anarchism: The Egalitarian Dharma of Uchiyama
Gudō (Institute  of  Buddhist  Studies  &  BDK  America).  Whalen  Lai  (1984).
“Seno'o Girō and the Dilemma of Modern Buddhism – Leftist Prophet of the
Lotus Sūtra”, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 11.1: 7-42. Stephen Large
(1987).  “Buddhism, Socialism,  and Protest  in  Prewar Japan:  The Career of
Seno'o Girō”, Modern Asian Studies 21.1: 153-171. James Mark Shields (2012). “A
Blueprint  for  Buddhist  Revolution:  The  Radical  Buddhism  of  Seno'o  Girō
(1889-1961)  and  the  Youth  League  for  Revitalizing  Buddhism”,  Japanese
Journal of Religious Studies 39.2: 333-351. James Mark Shields (2014). “Seno'o
Giro:  The  Life  and  Thought  of  a  Radical  Buddhist”,  in:  Todd  Lewis  (ed.),
Buddhists:  Understanding  Buddhism  through  the  Lives  of  Practicioners
(Wiley), pp. 280-288.
55 Patrice Ladwig & James Mark Shields (2014). “Introduction”, Politics, Religion
&  Ideology 15.2:  187-204.  James  Mark  Shields  (2017).  Against  Harmony:
Progressive  and  Radical  Buddhism  in  Modern  Japan (Oxford  University
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“position that  is  (1)  politically  engaged;  and (2)  in opposition to the
hegemonic socio-political and/or economic ideology (or ideologies) of a
given  period”  and  a  “radical  Buddhist”  as  “anyone  engaged  in  the
explicit or implicit use of Buddhist doctrines or principles to forment
resistance  to  the  state  and/or  the  socio-political  and/or  economic
status quo”.56 Obviously, this notion of “radical Buddhism” is something
very  different  from  Batchelor’s  and  other  Western  “secular
Buddhisms”, but many radical Buddhists – perhaps, Seno'o Girō most
notably – aspired to secularize Buddhism in important respects as well,
and  consequently,  there  are  interesting  similarities,  but  even  more
interesting differences. But before we can have a closer look at those I
need to make a few remarks about the roots of Buddhist radicalism.57
Press).
56 Ladwig & Shields (2014), “Introduction”, p. 16.
57 On this topic, see also: James Mark Shields (2016) “Opium Eaters: Buddhism
as  Revolutionary  Politics”,  in:  Hiroko  Kawanami  (ed.),  Buddhism  and  the
Political Process (Springer), pp. 213-234.
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reality and compassion
There  are  two  aspects  of  Mahāyāna  thought  that  are  particularly
important in the present context. One is the apparently rather esoteric
metaphysical  distinction  between  ultimate  and  conventional  reality
and  some  of  its  extensions  and  interpretations.  The  other  is  the
Bodhisattva  ideal,  which  is  a  defining  characteristic  of  Mahāyāna
thought.
the conventional and the real
When you see a table, you see that thing as a table and, unless you have
never encountered a table before and have no concept of “table”, you
cannot  really  do  otherwise.  We  experience  things  as  belonging  to
certain conceptual categories – we see trees as trees, houses as houses,
and so forth. Thus, in looking at a landscape like the following picture
[see  next  page],  I  do  not  just  see  the  landscape  as  it  is  given  by
independent, external reality.
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Rather,  I  see  hills  as hills,  a  village  as village,  clusters of  farms  as
farms, fields  as fields, and so forth. In other words, the things in the
scene  come  pre-classified  and  I  cannot  consciously  see  the  scene
independently from or prior to that classification.
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Our  minds  place  a  kind  of  conceptual  overlay  over  reality  –
something like  the  following drawing –  and that  conceptual  overlay
determines how we experience reality (and how we remember it)  as
much as the scene it tries to capture, categorize, and tame.
The original scene or the first picture can be thought off as being
roughly analogous  to  the  Buddhist  concept  of  ultimate  reality;  the
conceptual  overlay  depicted  in  the  drawing  is  then  analogous  to
conventional reality – the world as we experience it, mediated by our
conceptual categories. A related distinction has been made in Western
philosophy by Kant, for example – the first picture is then analogous to
“the  things  in  themselves”  or  noumenal reality  and  the  third  to
phenomenal reality. There are important differences, however, and there
are very different interpretations of what exactly ultimate reality is and
how  it  relates  to  conventional  reality  within  Buddhism  as  well.
Furthermore, different schools of Buddhism would probably object to
the analogy on different grounds, and consequently, the analogy should
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not be taken too far – it’s a tool for explanation, but nothing more than
that.
The main point of contention between philosophers and schools of
thought concerns the relation between ultimate or noumenal  reality
and  conventional  or  phenomenal  reality.  Essentialists hold  that  the
boundaries  drawn by  our  conceptual  overlay  correspond  with  given
boundaries  in  nature  or  external  reality.  Or  in  other  words,
classification of some things as trees, or shrubs, or houses, or hills, and
so forth are not arbitrary but are – more or less – given by the way
things are. Noumenal (or external or independent – there is no lack of
terms to choose from) reality comes pre-classified into many different
kinds  and  our  conceptual  apparatuses  track  these  naturally  given
classifications. Consequently, noumenal reality and phenomenal reality
are really pretty much the same. Such essentialism has been the default
position of much of Western philosophy (especially in the Middle Ages),
but it also has been attacked by many.58
Anti-essentialists reject  this  picture.  According  to  anti-essentialists
conceptual boundaries are – at least to some extent – arbitrary. In some
cases this is kind of obvious – where we draw the boundary between
hills and mountains, for example, is not plausibly determined by nature,
but is just  a matter of  definition – but in other cases it  may be less
obvious.  Anti-essentialists  typically  hold  that  things  in  the  same
category have no shared essences and that there are gray areas between
categories  –  we draw  the  boundaries  between  those  categories  by
arbitrary convention. Thus, while essentialists believe that reality as we
consciously experience it – that is phenomenal or conventional reality –
58 Under the influence of Saul Kripke’s Naming and Necessity a version of such
essentialism remains the default in contemporary analytic philosophy.
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is directly given by nature or the world itself (i.e. noumenal or ultimate
reality),  anti-essentialists  belief  that  reality  as  we experience  it  isn’t
given, but is constructed by us. Phenomenal or conventional reality is a
social  construction.  And  consequently,  while  for  the  essentialist  our
conceptual  distinctions  correspond  with  “real”  distinctions  (in
noumenal or ultimate reality), for the anti-essentialist they don’t.
Nevertheless,  an  anti-essentialist  can  take  very  different  attitudes
towards  conventional  or  phenomenal  reality  and  the  conceptual
categorizations it is based on. She can take a more negative attitude and
stress  the  fact  that  conceptual  boundaries  do  not  track  “real”
boundaries,  and therefore,  that  conceptual  categories  are  effectively
mistaken and that any apparent reality based on it is illusory. Or she
can  take  a  more  positive  attitude  and  stress  that  the  conceptual
boundaries  are  partially  caused  by  external  reality  (for  example,
because  they  are  drawn in  gray  zones  and  are  thus  not  completely
randomly),  and  therefore,  that  conceptual  categories  only  show  a
partial  view  or  perspective  –  and  are  thus  incomplete  rather  than
mistaken. (On a side note, I have argued for something like the latter in
a number of papers,59 and this metaphysical issue was really what got
me interested in Buddhism in the first place.)
Buddhism is anti-essentialist, which has a number of interesting and
important  implications,  but  different  schools,  currents,  and thinkers
59 Lajos Brons (2013). “Meaning and Reality: A Cross-Traditional Encounter”, in:
Bo  Mou  &  R.  Tieszen  (eds.),  Constructive  Engagement  of  Analytic  and
Continental Approaches in Philosophy (Leiden: Brill), pp. 199-220. Lajos Brons
(2012).  “Dharmakīrti,  Davidson,  and  Knowing  Reality”,  Comparative
Philosophy 3.1: 30-57. Lajos Brons (2011). “Applied Relativism and Davidson’s
Arguments against Conceptual Schemes”, The Science of Mind 49: 221-240.
39 on secular and radical Buddhism 39
have taken different attitudes towards conventional reality and have
differently  conceptualized  various  aspects  and  details  of  the
ultimate/conventional reality distinction. One particular implication of
Buddhist anti-essentialism is worth mentioning here because it bears
directly  on  a  fundamental  tendency  of  “secular  Buddhism”.  Because
conventional  reality  is  only  a  partial  view  at  best  and  completely
mistaken at worst and any description is necessarily in language and
thus  a  description  of  conceptualized  conventional  reality,  any
description  is  only  partial  and  incomplete  at  best  (and  illusory  at
worst). Or in other words, anti-essentialists reject the idea that there is
one and only one true description of something.  This also applies to
history  –  any  description  of  historical  facts  is  just  one  particular
perspective thereon (if  one takes the positive attitude – it  is  utterly
mistaken if one takes the negative attitude). And consequently, from a
Buddhist anti-essentialist point of view, the project of reconstructing a
single, authoritative account of the historical Buddha and his teachings
makes about as much sense as declaring that the only right way to see a
cup is from the side and with its ear on the right.60
Due  to  historical  circumstances,  the  epicenter  of  philosophical
activity  and  innovation  in  Buddhism  gradually  moved  in  a  roughly
northeasterly  direction.  From  India  (and  Sri  Lanka)  to  Tibet,  China,
Korea, and Japan. Perhaps, for cultural reasons this move more or less
corresponds  with  a  shift  in  attitude  from  more  “negative”  to  more
“positive”.61 (One reason to believe that culture played a role in this is
60 Jan  Westerhoff  makes  a  similar  point  in  his  (2018)  The  Golden  Age  of
Buddhist Philosophy.
61 See, for example: Brons (2013), “Meaning and Reality”; Fung Yu-Lan (1948), A
Short History of Chinese Philosophy, translated and edited by Derk Bodde
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that – aside from Daoism, perhaps – classical Chinese philosophy was
more “down to earth”, and therefore, closer to the positive attitude.)
Because the negative attitude never allows one to (truthfully!)  say
what  something  is,  and  only  what  something  is  not  (because  all
conceptual  classifications  are  mistaken),  the  negative  attitude  is
characterized by negative language or apophasis (or apophatic discourse).
In  contrast,  while  the  positive  attitude  recognizes  that  any
conceptualization  is  only  partial,  one-sided,  provisional,  and
incomplete, this does not imply that conceptualizations are inherently
wrong.  In  other  words,  despite  these  caveats,  the  positive  attitude
allows one to say what something is – at least provisionally, partially,
etcetera.  In  contrast  to  apophatic discourse,  such positive discourse  is
called  kataphatic discourse.62 Robert  Gimello  argues  that  much
Mahāyāna philosophy (especially in China) developed out of “profound
dissatisfaction with the seemingly relentless apophasis of Nāgārjuna”.
Alternatives  to  the  view  of  Nāgārjuna  and  the  Mādhyamika  school
based  on  his  thought  stressed  “the  spiritual  utility  of  positive  and
affirmative language” – “they chose … eloquence over silence”.63
For Nāgārjuna (2-3rd century), ultimate reality was “emptiness”, and
emptiness was itself empty (i.e. beyond conceptual description, and thus
(New York: MacMillan); Robert Sharf (2002),  Coming to Terms with Chinese
Buddhism:  a  Reading  of  the  Treasure  Store  Treatise (Honolulu:  Kuroda
Institute / University Of Hawai‘i Press). Robert Gimello (1976), “Apophatic and
Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna: A Chinese View”,  Philosophy East and
West 26.2: 117-136.
62 The terminology comes from Western theology. In that context apophasis
refers to the impossibility to use positive language in describing God.
63 Gimello (1976), “Apophatic and Kataphatic Discourse in Mahāyāna”, p. 119.
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apophatic).  While  later  Indian  thinkers  often  took  a  somewhat  less
negative/apohatic  attitude,  Nāgārjuna’s  shadow  was  long.  A  few
centuries  after  Nāgārjuna,  Dignāga  (5-6th  century)  and  Dharmakīrti
(7th  century)  emphasized  that  conceptual  categories  are  social
conventions  with  roots  in  the  ultimately  real,  but  even  this  was
couched in apophatic terms. Conceptual construction was supposed to
take  place  through  a  process  called  apoha that  avoids  positive  or
affirmative  statements.  That  is,  we learn a  concept  of  “cow” not  by
classifying things as cows but as not non-cows.
Nāgārjuna’s theory of the emptiness of emptiness entails that even
ultimate  reality  is  only  conventionally  real.  Chinese  Buddhism,
however, turned this on its head – from Nāgārjuna’s conventionality of
the  ultimately  real  it  developed  into  the  ultimate  reality  of  the
conventional; that is, a kataphatic affirmation of conventional reality.64
In  Fung  Yu-lan’s  Short  History  of  Chinese  Philosophy the  result  of  this
transformation is summarized as follows:
The reality of the Buddha-nature [noumenal reality] is itself the
phenomenal  world,  (.  .  .).  There is  no other  reality outside the
phenomenal world, (. . .). Some people in their Ignorance, see only
the phenomenal world, but not the reality of the Buddha-nature.
Other people, in their Enlightenment, see the Buddha-nature, but
this Buddha-nature is still the phenomenal world. What these two
kinds of people see is the same, but what one person sees in his
Enlightenment has  a significance quite  different from what the
other person sees in his Ignorance.65
64 See: Brons (2013), “Meaning and Reality”.
65 pp. 252-3.
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the Lotus Sūtra
One of the most important texts for Chinese Buddhism (and its Japanese
and Korean offspring) is the Lotus Sūtra. The Lotus Sūtra is a very strange
text. It is supposed to be the Buddha’s final teaching, but it appears to
be mostly about itself and it is filled with exaggerated exotic imagery of
flying jeweled stūpas, gigantic audiences, and supernatural feats. The
Lotus Sūtra represents pretty much everything many Western secular
Buddhist dislike about Buddhism as a living religion in East Asia, which
is probably most neatly illustrated by an anecdote in Donald Lopez’s
book  about  the  Sūtra.66 In  his  university  course  “Introduction  of
Buddhism”  he  starts  with  a  series  of  lectures  on  more  or  less
philosophical  topics  addressed  by  Buddhism  –  the  kind  of  topics
Western  Buddhist  and Westerners  with an interest  in  Buddhism are
typically interested in,  ranging from more metaphysical  questions to
meditation and the Four Noble Truths. Much of the second half of the
course is dedicated to the Lotus Sūtra, however, which tends to provoke
disappointment and even outrage  in students.  The  Lotus  Sūtra is  too
fantastic, too supernatural, too inauthentic (its earliest parts date to the
first century), too religious (and not enough philosophical), and so forth
for secular Western preferences. He quotes a student as asking: “How
can people accept the words of one monk who decided to write a text to
completely  change  Buddhism?”  To  some  extent,  the  outrage  and
rejection is  understandable.  It  is  indeed extremely  unlikely  that  the
Lotus Sūtra was taught by the Buddha, and the text is indeed overly self-
referential and overly ornate, but there it is not true that it represents a
66 Donald  Lopez  (2016).  The  Lotus  Sūtra:  A  Biography (Princeton University
Press).
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radical  deviation  from  other/earlier  teachings  and  there  is  more
lurking below the ornate surface than a casual glance might suggest.
Like many religious texts, the Lotus Sūtra requires patience and study.
I’m not sure how and why the  Lotus Sūtra became as important and
influential  as  it  is,  but  one  of  the  reasons  may  be  related  to  the
foregoing. The “reality” described in the Sūtra – the one with the flying
stūpas,  shaking earth,  and various other supernatural  fables – is  the
reality  seen  through  the  eyes  of  enlightened  beings  and  thus,
supposedly, ultimate reality. But that fantastic ultimate reality is not a
different world – it is the world we live in and are familiar with, it is
merely  seen  with  (or  through)  different  eyes.  As  Gene  Reeves  has
pointed out, the Lotus Sūtra – despite its fantastic imagery – is radically
world-affirming.67 Conventional  reality  and  ultimate  reality  are  not
different worlds. Rather, there is just one world, which can be perceived
or thought about in different ways.
The Lotus Sūtra was the principal text of the Tiantai 天台 school of
Buddhism, the first Buddhist school that developed entirely in China.
Tiantai  spread  to  neighboring  countries  and  became  especially
influential in Japan as  Tendai (the Japanese pronunciation of  天台 ).
12th  century  Japan  saw  a  series  of  important  developments  and
innovations in Buddhist doctrine leading to the establishment of new
schools and sects, but their (intellectual) founders – Hōnen 法然 (Pure
Land Buddhism), Nichiren 日蓮, and Dōgen 道元 (Sōtō Zen) – were all
originally  Tendai  monks.  Before  discussing  some  of  those  (Nichiren
67 Gene Reeves (2002). “The Lotus Sutra as Radically World-Affirming”, in: Gene
Reeves (ed.),  A Buddhist Kaleidoscope: Essays on the Lotus Sutra (Tokyo:
Kosei), pp. 177-199.
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particularly), we need to pay some attention to Tiantai’s founder, Zhiyi
(Chih-i) 智顗 (6th century), however.
Above, I tried to explain that one can take different attitudes towards
the  relation  between  ultimate  and  conventional  reality.  A  more
negative  or  apophatic attitude  rejects  language  as  a  reliable  tool  to
understand  or  represent  ultimate  reality,  while  a  more  positive,
affirmative, or kataphatic attitude considers language an imperfect, but
still  useful  tool  that  can at  least  produce  a  partial  view of  ultimate
reality.  And  while  Indian  Buddhism  was  more  apophatic,  Chinese
Buddhism  took  a  much  more  positive  approach.  Zhiyi  very  clearly
exemplifies  this  shift  from  apophatic  (negative)  to  kataphatic
(positive/affirmative) discourse. Thus, Paul Swanson writes that:
affirmation of the use of language tempered by the awareness of
its limitations is exactly the position taken by Chih-i [Zhiyi], who
is constantly re-affirming the inadequacy of language to describe
reality, yet immediately affirms the necessity to use language in
the attempt to describe the indescribable and conceptualize that
which is beyond conceptualization.68
The latter point is important to keep in mind when reading Buddhist
writings from China and Japan: language is necessary but inadequate to
describe ultimate reality (which by definition is beyond – or before –
language),  and consequently  Buddhist  monks and philosophers often
had to resort to dense metaphors. A reader who fails to look beyond
those metaphors would completely miss the point, however.
68 Paul Swanson (1989). Foundations of T’ien-T’ai Philosophy: The Flowering of
the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism (Asian Humanities Press), p. 23.
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In his  Profound Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra 妙法蓮華經玄義 , Zhiyi
argued that the Lotus Sūtra teaches the non-duality of reality:
The (ultimately) real is identical with the conventional, and the
conventional is identical with the (ultimately) real. True nature is
like a pearl: the pearl is analogous to the (ultimately) real and its
function is analogous to the conventional [-ly real]. The pearl is
identical with the function and the function is identical with the
jewel;  they  are  non-dual,  but  two;  it  is  merely  a  [conceptual]
division between [what we call] the (ultimately) “real” and [what
we call] the “conventional”.69
Hence, for Zhiyi, Tiantai, and pretty much all the thinkers, sects, and
schools  that  were  influenced  by  Zhiyi,  reality  is  non-dual.  Ultimate
reality and conventional reality are not two different realities, but two
different perspectives on one and the same reality. (Although it can be
debated  whether  “perspective”  is  the  best  term.)  Consequently,  the
apocryphal Chinese  Treasure Store Treatise 寶藏論 asserts that this
implies that upon reaching enlightenment and learning to see ultimate
reality “there is nothing to be realized, nothing to be attained, and yet if
there  is  no  realization  or  attainment,  the  mind  will  forever  be
confused”.70 And  the  Japanese  Zen  philosopher  Dōgen  wrote  that
“opening flowers and falling leaves [the phenomenal world] is nature
(such) as it is. However, fools think that there are no opening flowers
69 My translation. 「真即是俗；俗即是真。如如意珠，珠以譬真，用以譬俗。
如如意珠，珠以譬真，用以譬俗。即珠是用，即用是珠，不二而二，分
真俗耳。」 妙法蓮華經玄義, T33n1716, 703b21.
70 Translated  by  Robert  Sharf.  See:  Sharf  (2002),  Coming  to  Terms  with
Chinese Buddhism, p. 159.
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and falling leaves in the world of Dharma-nature [ultimate reality]”.71 In
other words, the conventional is not ultimately unreal. However, Dōgen
emphasized that this realization should not lead to the opposite kind of
foolishness: “Although people now have a deep understanding of the
contents (heart) of seas and rivers, we still do not know how dragons
and fish understand and use water.  Do not  foolishly assume that  all
kinds of beings use as water that what we understand as water”.72 So,
while the conventional is not ultimately unreal, it doesn’t represent the
whole  of  ultimate  reality  either,  but  merely  one  particular
perspective.73
Nichiren – like Dōgen a former Tendai monk – considered himself the
only real follower of Saichō 最澄 (8-9th century) who brought Tiantai
to Japan and established Tendai. Japanese Tendai had become corrupted
(in Nichiren’s view) with esoteric influences and had deviated from the
one  and  only  true  teachings  of  the  Lotus  Sūtra.  Thus,  Nichiren’s
philosophical roots were growing in Tiantai soil, and consequently, he
emphatically rejected metaphysical dualism. Lucia Dolce, for example,
71 My translation. 「しかあれば、開花葉落、これ如是性なり。しかあるに、
愚人おもはくは、法性界には開花葉落あるべからず。」 正法眼藏 , 法
性.




73 For more about Dōgen’s perspectivism, see: Hee-Jin Kim (2007),  Dōgen on
Meditation  and Thinking:  a  Reflection  on His  View of  Zen (Albany:  SUNY
Press);  Bret  Davis  (2011),  “The  Philosophy  of  Zen  Master  Dōgen:  Egoless
Perspectivism”,  in:  Garfield  &  Edelglass  (eds.),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of
World Philosophy Oxford University Press), pp.  348–360; and Brons (2013),
“Meaning and Reality”.
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writes that: “For Nichiren … there is only one … world. Vulture Peak,
the place where the Lotus Sutra is taught represents both this world of
ours and the most perfect world, the only possible ‘paradise’. There is
no other reality, neither for humanity, nor for the Buddha”.74
social reality
If you are wondering what all these metaphysical ideas about different
kinds of or perspectives on reality have to do with  radical Buddhism,
this last quote about Nichiren might give you a clue about the answer.
Again, a bit of unpacking is necessary, so bear with me a little longer.
Supposedly, only enlightened beings like Buddhas can see ultimate
reality.  Because of  this,  the notion of ultimate reality has sometimes
been associated with less metaphysical and more mythical notions and
the  same  is  true  for  the  ultimate/conventional  distinction.
Conventional reality, then, is not just the world as we experience it, but
the  world  we  live  in  –  the  world  of  endless  suffering  (caused  by
ignorance and the cycle of death and rebirth) – and ultimate reality is
the  world  of  the  Buddha(s).  Thus,  notions  like  “Buddha  lands”  and
paradises came to be associated with the notion of ultimate reality. The
goal of enlightenment, then, was not just to see ultimate reality, but to
go there – to go to this paradise-like or Utopian other world.
74 Lucia Dolce (2002).  “Between Duration and Eternity:  Hermeneutics  of  the
‘Ancient Buddha’ of the Lotus Sutra in Chih-i and Nichiren”, in: Gene Reeves
(ed.), A Buddhist Kaleidoscope: Essays on the Lotus Sutra (Tokyo: Kosei), pp.
223-239.
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But if one gives up on dualism – if there is just one world – then this
radically changes. Then, there is no other world. There is just this one
world. But that doesn’t mean that this world is already a Buddha land or
a paradise.  What  it  implies  is  that  such a  Buddha land,  paradise,  or
Utopia can only be realized in this world. Furthermore, the Buddha’s
teachings do not just imply that it can be realized in this world, but that
it  must be  realized  in  this  world.  Recall  that  ultimate  reality  is  not
something  one  “sees”  already,  but  something one  needs  to  learn  to
“see”. Analogously, if there is just one world and ultimate reality is a
perspective or aspect of that one world, then that perspective or aspect
isn’t  there (i.e. seen) already,  but  waiting to be realized.  Or in other
words, aiming for enlightenment (i.e. “learning to see”) is aiming for the
realization of a Buddha Land (or something like it) in this world. This
was  for  Nichiren  the  logical  conclusion  of  the  Lotus  Sūtra and
Tiantai/Tendai  thought.  And  thereby,  Buddhism  suddenly  became
political – and radical.75
This  last  statement  requires  some  qualification.  To  some  extent,
Buddhism has always been political,76 but as Patrice Ladwig and James
Mark  Shields  point  out,  Buddhism  almost  always  allied  itself  with
hegemonic rule, and usually those rulers didn’t behave much like ideal
Buddhist  kings.  “Indeed, this alliance [between Buddhism and states]
has on occasion taken on violent and militaristic forms that sustain the
75 See also: James Mark Shields (2013). “Political Interpretations of the  Lotus
Sūtra”,  in:  Steven  Emmanuel  (ed.),  A  Companion  to  Buddhist  Philosophy
(Wiley): 512-523.
76 Especially in Japan where its main initial role was to carry out rituals that
were supposed to protect the state.
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rule of regimes that are in power in Buddhist countries”.77 And Michael
Jerryson  and  Mark  Juergensmeyer  note  that  there  has  been  a
“widespread  propensity  among  states  to  adopt  Buddhism  as  official
religion and for Buddhism to provide the rationalization for the state’s
sanctioned  use  of  violence”.78 In  other  words,  Buddhism has  always
been political, but its political role has (almost) always been in support
of the powers that be. With Nichiren that changed – traditionally, the
role  of  Buddhism  was  to  serve  the  state,  but  Nichiren  turned  that
around and required the state to serve Buddhism. Consequently, he and
his followers routinely “admonished” the state for not following the
right path (i.e. that of Nichiren’s interpretation of the Lotus Sūtra).
Many Buddhist modernizers and radical Buddhist of the early 20th
century were heavily influenced by Nichiren. The predominant reading
of Nichiren – especially by proponents of so-called “Nichirenism” – was
nationalist, or even fascist, and indeed provided “the rationalization for
the  state’s  sanctioned  use  of  violence”.  The  cornerstone  of  the
nationalist  reading of  Nichiren was  a  quote from his  Establishing  the
Peace of the Country 立正安國論: “First we should pray for the nation,
and after that we should establish the Buddhist  law”. The quote has
usually been interpreted as signifying that for Nichiren the state has
priority over the Buddhist law, but that interpretation is absurd for a
number of reasons.79
77 Ladwig & Shields (2014), “Introduction”, p. 4.
78 Quoted in: Ladwig & Shields (2014), “Introduction”, p. 4.
79 See  also ： Satō  Hiroo  (1999),  “Nichiren’s  View  of  Nation  and  Religion”,
Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 26.3/4: 307-323.
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Firstly, the word “state” 國家 (or 国家 in modern Japanese) occurs
only twice in the text. In all other cases Nichiren used the word kuni 國,
which means something like land, country, district, or area including its
inhabitants, but which has no nationalistic connotation.80 This should
be kind of obvious, as the notion of the nation was only invented in
Europe much later and imported in Japan in the 19th century. In the
two cases were Nichiren used  國家 he was clearly referring to the
state or government. Kuni 國, on the other hand, was a neutral term –
the topic of  the text  was creating peace  and harmony in some area
(kuni), and not the creation of some harmonious state.
Secondly,  the  idea  that  Nichiren  prioritized  the  state  is  obviously
incorrect if the quote isn’t lifted out of its context.
The country is prosperous because it relies on the Dharma. The
Dharma is valuable because of the people. If the country would be
destroyed and the people exterminated, who can [still] revere the
Buddha? How can one [still] have faith in the Dharma? [Therefore]
One must pray for the state first, and then establish the Dharma.81
Hence, what Nichiren is saying here is that to establish something
like  a  Buddhist  paradise,  we  must  first  ensure  peace,  harmony,  and
prosperity.  In other words,  a functioning (and benevolent!)  state is a
prerequisite  for  establishing the  Dharma,  but  that  doesn’t  make the
80 On Nichiren’s use of the word kuni 國 (and the lack on nationalistic or ethnic
connotations in that use), see also: Jacqueline Stone (1999), “Placing Nichiren
in the ‘Big Picture’: Some Ongoing Issues in Scholarship”,  Japanese Journal
of Religious Studies 26.3-4: 382-421, p. 412.
81 My translation. 「夫國依法而昌。法因人而貴。國亡人滅。佛誰可崇。法
難可信哉。先祈國家須立佛法。」 立正安國論, T84n2688.
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state a priority. That would be confusing means and ends. (And once
again, for Nichiren, the role of the state is to serve Buddhism, not the
other way around.)
Thirdly, Nichiren repeatedly states throughout his writings that he
“vowed to summon up a  powerful and unconquerable desire for  the
salvation of all beings, and never falter in [his] efforts”.82 He didn’t just
aim for the elevation of Japan or the Japanese people, but he considered
himself  a  Bodhisattva  aiming  for  the  liberation  of  all  of  mankind.
Nevertheless,  he did believe that Japan had a special  role to  play in
saving  and  spreading  Buddhism,  and  in  saving/liberating  people
elsewhere.83
While early 20th century “Nichirenism” was on the extreme right of
the political spectrum, Nichiren himself cannot really be located on the
same spectrum. The reason for this is that Nichiren’s political diagnosis
and solution is fundamentally at odds with the modernist assumptions
that  ground  contemporary  political  ideologies  and  the  left/right
spectrum. “Famine and disease rage more fiercely than ever, beggars
are  everywhere  in  sight,  and  scenes  of  death  fill  out  eyes”  writes
82 The Opening of the Eyes 開目抄 .  Translation in:  Philip  Yampolsky (ed.)
(1990),  Selected  Writings  of  Nichiren (Columbia  University  Press),  p.  79.
Emphasis added.
83 Nichiren observed that Buddhism has spread from India to China and from
China to Japan, but had since disappeared in India and was on the decline in
China.  This  geographical  direction  had  to  be  turned around.  Only  Japan
could bring Buddhism back to China, India, and then the rest of the world.
For  “Nichirenists”  this  was  an  attractive  way  to  legitimize  Japanese
conquests and hegemony in East Asia in the early 20th century. See also:
Stone (1999), “Placing Nichiren in the ‘Big Picture’”.
52 on secular and radical Buddhism 52
Nichiren  in  Establishing  the  Peace  of  the  Country.84 These  are  the
symptoms.  Nichiren’s  diagnosis  of  the  underlying  “disease”  (not  his
term)  causing these  symptoms is  insufficient  reverence  of  the  Lotus
Sūtra by the people (and state). And consequently, his recommendation
for a cure aims to rectify that. But chanting the title of the Lotus Sūtra
(Nichiren’s  remedy)  is  –  obviously  –  not  a  policy  that  fits  on  the
left/right spectrum (or any other political spectrum, for that matter).
the Bodhisattva ideal
While the extension of metaphysical ideas gave Buddhism a (potential!)
political  role,  the  Bodhisattva  ideal  gave  it  a  (potential!)  goal.  A
Bodhisattva  (in  Mahāyāna)  is  someone  who  has  vowed  or
spontaneously  committed  himself85 to  liberate  every  sentient  being
(humans, animals, and so forth) from the suffering associated with the
cycle of death and rebirth. A Bodhisattva is an enlightened being like a
Buddha  and  destined  to  become  a  Buddha,  but  not  before
saving/liberating everyone (and everything) else.
The  foremost  quality  of  a  Bodhisattva  is  compassion  –  it  is  his
compassion  that  drives  him  to  commit  himself  to  liberating/saving
everyone  else  (before  entering  Nirvāṇa  himself).  The  Buddhist
literature  is  littered  with  stories  of  acts  of  extreme  generosity  and
84 Translation in: Yampolsky (1990), Selected Writings of Nichiren, p. 14.
85 Buddhism is rather sexist, I’m afraid. Bodhisattvas are typically assumed to
be  male,  and  in  many  traditions  women  cannot  possibly  reach
enlightenment at all. The best a woman can hope for is rebirth as a man.
There are exceptions, of course. The aforementioned Nichiren, for example,
had a considerably less sexist view – at least in this respect.
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altruism by Bodhisattvas. One of the most famous such stories is that of
Prince Sattva offering himself as food to a hungry tiger and her cubs.
Parts of chapter 8 of Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra give a glimpse of the
mindset of a Bodhisattva: “Those who have developed the continuum of
their  mind  in  this  way  [i.e. Bodhisattvas],  to  whom  the  suffering  of
others is as important as the things they themselves hold dear, plunge
down into the Avīci  hell  as geese into a cluster of lotus blossoms”.86
Somewhat less  flowery, he writes about what it  takes to achieve the
Bodhisattva’s mindset (i.e. bodhicitta). The key – as mentioned before – is
what  Śāntideva  calls  the  “exchange  of  self  and  other”  –  that  is,
identifying with the needs, concerns, and suffering of others as if they
were one’s own: “in order to allay my own suffering and to allay the
suffering  of  others,  I  devote  myself  to  others  and  accept  them  as
myself”.87 This  doesn’t  necessarily  imply  a  life  of  suffering  for  the
Bodhisattva  himself,  however,  because  “All  those  who  suffer  in  the
world do so because of their desire for their own happiness. All those
happy in the world are so because of their desire for the happiness of
others”.88 This  is  not  what  motivates  a  Bodhisattva,  however.  A
Bodhisattva  finds  happiness  in  alleviating  the  suffering  of  others
because that is the kind of person a Bodhisattva is – that is what it is to
be a Bodhisattva.
A second key characteristic of a Bodhisattva is that he is something
like a teacher,  and that he selects  (teaching)  methods that  are most
appropriate (i.e. most helpful) for a particular audience. This is called
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“skillful means” (or “skill in means”, upāya-kauśalya), and is one of the
main topics of the Lotus Sūtra. Gene Reeves explains that what it means
to be a Bodhisattva in the  Lotus Sūtra is “using appropriate means to
help  others”.89 One  of  the  most  famous  stories  illustrating  skillful
means in the Lotus Sūtra is the “Parable of the Burning House” in which
a  father  lies  about  magnificent  carriages  waiting  outside  to  lure  his
children out of a burning house. (Apparently, they are too engrossed in
their play to notice the fire.) The point of this story and other stories
like it  is  that a Bodhisattva can (and should) use any means to save
people (and other sentient beings) from suffering if that is the only way
to do so. For a truly compassionate Bodhisattva, the end (of alleviating
suffering) justifies the means.
In Mahāyāna everyone is encouraged to try to become a Bodhisattva
and  to  take  a  vow  or  vows  towards  that  end.  The  most  famous
Bodhisattva  vows  were  formulated  by  Zhiyi,  the  aforementioned
founder  of  Tiantai,  in  his  Exposition  on  the  Dharma  Gateway  to  the
Perfection of Meditation 釋禪波羅蜜次第法門:
These  are  the  four  Bodhisattva  vows.  …  Even  though  sentient
beings  are unlimited [in number],  I  vow to liberate/save [them
all].  … Even though the  kleśas90 are innumerable,  I  vow to stop
[them  all].  …  Even  though  the  Buddhist  teachings  are
89 Gene Reeves (2002). “Appropriate Means as the Ethics of the Lotus Sutra”, in:
Gene  Reeves  (ed.),  A  Buddhist  Kaleidoscope:  Essays  on  the  Lotus  Sutra
(Tokyo: Kosei): 379-392, p. 386.
90 Kleśas are afflictions ore negative emotions such as ignorance, attachment
(or craving), and aversion (or hatred).
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inexhaustible,  I  vow  to  know  [them  all].  …  Even  though
Buddhahood is unsurpassable, I vow to attain [it].91
It should be fairly obvious that realizing these vows would require
much more than what is humanly possible, but making a vow doesn’t
commit one to succeeding, merely to trying, and it’s the intention (i.e.
the trying) that matters. In the Bodhicaryāvatāra Śāntideva wrote:
If the perfection of generosity consists in making the universe free
from  poverty  how  can  previous  Protectors  [i.e. Buddhas  and
Bodhisattvas] have acquired it, when the world is still poor, even
today?
The  perfection  of  generosity  is  said  to  result  from  the  mental
attitude to relinquishing all that one has to all  people, together
with the fruit of that act. Therefore, the perfection is the mental
attitude itself.92
Of course, if one has a genuine intention to save everyone, one will
try to get closer to that goal, even if it is just a little bit. And if one has a
genuine  intention  to  learn  everything  that  matters  (here  limited  to
Buddhist  teachings,  but  we’ll  encounter  different  views below),  then
there is a fairly good chance that there will be at least some success. But
still, what ultimately matters is not (just) the success, but the genuine
commitment  to  save  all  sentient  beings.  That  compassion  is  what
defines a Bodhisattva.
91 My translation. 「四弘誓願者。... 亦云眾生無邊誓願度。... 亦云煩惱無數誓
願斷。... 亦云法門無盡誓願知。 ... 亦云無上佛道誓願成。」 釋禪波羅蜜
次第法門, T46n1916, 476b.
92 Śāntideva.  Bodhicaryāvatāra. Translated by Kate Crosby & Andrew Skilton,
5:9-10.
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radical Buddhism
The definition of “radical Buddhism” proposed by Patrice Ladwig and
James Mark Shields is explicitly politically neutral. As mentioned above,
they define “radical” in “radical Buddhism” as a “position that is (1)
politically  engaged;  and  (2)  in  opposition  to  the  hegemonic  socio-
political  and/or economic ideology (or ideologies) of  a given period”
and a “radical Buddhist” as “anyone engaged in the explicit or implicit
use of Buddhist doctrines or principles to foment resistance to the state
and/or  the  socio-political  and/or  economic  status  quo”.93
Consequently, they include many of the “Nichirenists” and other fascist
Buddhist “radicals” of the early 20th century in the “radical Buddhist”
category.  While  this  is  understandable  and  probably  also  defensible
from  a  historical  point  of  view,  there  is  something  awkward  and
apparently contradictory about this classification. That is, the supposed
“radicals”  on  the  far  right  were  not  really  “in  opposition  to  the
hegemonic socio-political and/or economic ideology” – in the contrary,
they wanted to strengthen it. One could, of course, say that they wanted
to radicalize hegemonic rule, but that’s not the notion of “radical” as
Ladwig  and  Shields  define  it,  and  under  their  definition,  it  is  very
debatable whether these right-wing movements and ideologues where
“radical Buddhist”.
93 Ladwig & Shields (2014), p. 16.
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Furthermore, including “Buddhists” on the extreme right under the
“radical  Buddhism” header is  also dubious for other reasons. Even if
those right-wing extremists were radicals in some sense, the “radical
Buddhist” label suggests some kind of radicalized Buddhism, and it is
hard  to  see  anything  like  that.  They  certainly  didn’t  radicalize  the
Bodhisattva  ideal,  or  the  compassion  and  loving-kindness  associated
therewith. They used a cherry-picked selection of Buddhist sources and
(misinterpreted) quotes to defend their ideology,94 of course, but that
doesn’t  really  seem  sufficient  for  the  qualification  either.  “Fascist
crypto-Buddhists”  seems  more  appropriate.  Regardless  of  what  one
would one to call those right-wing extremists, I will ignore them in the
following, as they have nothing interesting to teach.
If fascists and other right-wing extremists are excluded, there aren’t
many “radical Buddhists” left – certainly not in Japan, were Buddhism
often was (and still is) allied with the far right.95 There have been some
leftist modernizers of Buddhism outside Japan, such as Han Yongun in
Korea,96 but most of  those were hardly radical.  Hence, this leaves us
with just three: Uchiyama Gudō  内山愚童 (1874-1911) and Seno'o
Girō 妹尾義郎 (1890-1961) in Japan, and Taixu 太虛 (1890-1947) in
China. Uchiyama was arrested for treason and executed in 1911 and is
certainly interesting as a historical figure, but he wrote little and what
he wrote has very little to offer in terms of a theory for or of radical
94 See above on the “Nichirenist” misinterpretation of Nichiren.
95 The head of the Tendai sect is an adviser of the very powerful extreme-
right-wing organization  Nippon Kaigi,  for example. On the other hand, by
Japanese  standards,  Nippon Kaigi is  only  moderately  right  ring  and the
entire current government consists of members of the organization.
96 Han Yongun (2008). Selected Writings of Han Yongun.
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Buddhism.97 Taixu is best known (and very influential) as a reformer,
but was a radical anarchist during at least part of his life. He wrote a lot,
but only a few of his writings can be considered “radical” and those are
characterized by Justin Ritzinger as “the work of a young activist, not a
mature thinker” and as “more than a bit  of  a  mess”.98 Furthermore,
Taixu’s more radical writing are extremely Utopian and impractical.99
This,  then,  leaves  us  with  just  Seno'o,  but  that  might  very  well  be
enough.
Seno'o Girō and the Youth League
Seno'o Girō joined the right-wing Nichirenist movement in 1918, but
slowly drifted to the left. In 1931 he founded the Youth League for New
Buddhism  新興仏教青年同盟 .100 In  1936  he  was  arrested  and
imprisoned for treason. After five months of interrogation he confessed
his “crimes” and pledged his loyalty to the emperor, for which he never
97 See Rambelli (2013),  Zen Anarchism, for translations of most of Uchiyama’s
writings as well as a biography and introduction to his ideas.
98 Ritzinger (2014), “The Awakening of Faith in Anarchism”, p. 230.
99 Idem, p. 240.
100 The term Shinkō Bukkyō 新興仏教 which is part of the name of the Youth
League  is  also  part  of  the  title  of  Seno'o’s  two  most  important  writings.
Shinkō 新興 means something like “emerging”, “developing”, or sometimes
“new”. Although Seno'o certainly thought about Buddhism as a developing
body of thought – more about this below – “New Buddhism” appears to be
the most appropriate translation. Alternatively, one might want to split up the
compound and translate  shinkō 新興 as “newly flourishing”. Although this
does  seem to capture  what  Seno'o  intended to  express  with  the  term,  it
sounds a bit contrived.
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forgave himself. In 1942 he was released from prison, but he stayed in
the shadows after that.101
Seno'o and his Youth League were “radical Buddhist” in a sense of
“radical” only mentioned in passing in the previous section. Contrary to
right-wing “crypto-Buddhists”,  they  radicalized certain  key  ideas  and
tendencies  within  Buddhist  thought,  particularly  those  explained  in
previous sections. Someone who is “radical” in the sense intended here
accepts and advocates some (often philosophical or political) idea(s) in
a more unwavering, uncompromising, and consistent fashion than what
is considered the norm. To “radicalize” some idea(s) in this sense is to
emphasize implications or conclusions that were previously overlooked
or downplayed, but that in a rational, consistent reading really follow
from that idea or those ideas. (Jonathan Israel uses the term “rational
Enlightenment” in more or less this sense of “radical”, for example,102
and the “radicalism” of radical environmentalism and radical feminism
– at the very least – overlaps with it.) “Radical Buddhism” in this sense
means  a  (rational!)  thinking  through  of  the  theories,  trends,  and
tendencies of Buddhism or some large and important part thereof with
an emphasis on consistency and concrete implications. To some extent,
the kind of Buddhism advocated by Seno'o and the Youth League was
something like a radicalization of ideas by/in Nichiren, Tiantai/Tendai,
101 Lai (1984). “Seno'o Girō and the Dilemma of Modern Buddhism”. Large (1987).
“Buddhism,  Socialism,  and  Protest  in  Prewar  Japan”.  Shields  (2012).  “A
Blueprint for Buddhist Revolution. Shields (2014). “Seno'o Giro”. There are also
several publications about Seno'o in Japanese. I won’t list those here, but will
refer to some of them below.
102 Jonathan Israel (2001). Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of
Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford University Press).
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the Lotus Sūtra, and related thinkers and texts – it was, however, also a
transcendence thereof.
In his History of Japanese Buddhism: The Modern Era, Kashiwahara Yūsen
reports that:
In  the  founding  ceremony  [of  the  Youth  League  for  New
Buddhism],  the  following  three-point  mission  statement  was
adopted:
1) Looking up with great respect to the Śākyamuni Buddha, 103 the
greatest person that mankind has been endowed with, we vow to
realize the establishment of a Buddha land in accordance with the
principle of brotherly love.
2) Recognizing and denouncing the wrecked existence of all the
established sects that have desecrated the spirit of Buddhism, we
vow to promote a Buddhism appropriate to the new age.
3) Recognizing that the capitalist economic system goes against
the spirit of Buddhism and obstructs the livelihood and welfare of
the general public, we vow to reform this and realize the society
of the future.104
103 Śākyamuni  Buddha is  the most  common name for  the historical  Buddha
within Mahāyāna Buddhism






(1990), 『日本仏教史　現代』 (古川弘文館), p. 214.
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In  short,  the  mission  of  the  Youth  League  was  to  (1)  to  realize  a
Buddha Land (i.e. a more or less Utopian society) in this world,105 (2) to
reform Buddhism and reject  sectarian Buddhism, and (3) to reject and
reform capitalism. The last point (and to some extent the first two as
well) is also evident in a proclamation read in the first meeting of the
Youth League in 1931. “Recognizing that the suffering in present society
is mainly caused by the capitalist  economic system, and cooperating
[with others] to fundamentally correct that, New Buddhism pledges to
[focus on] the welfare of the general public.”106
The  first  stated  goal  in  the  Youth  League’s  mission  statement  –
realizing a Buddha Land in this world – is just straight up Nichiren’s
interpretation  of  the  Lotus  Sūtra and  Tiantai/Tendai  philosophy  (see
above), but there is an obvious difference between the Youth League
and  Nichiren  with  regards  to  their  ideas  about  how  to  realize  that
Buddha Land – that is, the third stated goal. The second stated goal also
reminds of Nichiren’s critique of the established Buddhist sects at his
time  (about  6  centuries  earlier).  Nichiren  also  believed  that  he  was
formulating  a  Buddhism  appropriate  to  his  age  and  also  repeatedly
claimed that the established sects  had desecrated Buddhism. So, two
out three goals in the Youth League’s mission statement align closely
with Nichiren’s  ideas.  Translate those two into Late Middle Japanese
and they could have been written or spoken by Nichiren.
105 This was also an explicit goal of Taixu. See note 111 below.
106 My translation. 「新興仏教は、現社会の苦悩は、主として資本主義経済
組織に基因するを認めて、これが根本的革正に協力して大衆の福利を
保障せんとする。」 新興仏教青年同盟 (New Buddhist Youth League)
(1931), 『宣言』 (Proclamation), reprinted in: 稲垣真美 (1974), 『仏陀を背
負いて街頭へ—妹尾義郎と新興仏教青年同盟』 (岩波新書): 3-6, p. 4.
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In the year of the Youth League’s founding, Seno'o Giro published a
pamphlet or book titled Turning towards a New Buddhism 新興佛教へ
の転身. It is in dialogue form and opens with an answer to a question
about his aims in writing it:
Firstly,  rejecting  the  corrupted  established  religious
organizations, I want to show the true value of Buddhism to the
current  era.  Secondly,  I  want  to  unify  divided  Buddhism  and
suppress  the ugly rivalry between the sects.  Thirdly,  I  want to
realize an ideal society of love and equality by participating in a
movement  to  reform  the  capitalist  economic  system,  which
conflicts with the spirit of the Buddha.107
Seno'o’s  aims  are  very  similar  to  those  of  the  Youth  League  he
founded, and that is no coincidence, of course. The first and second of
Seno'o’s aims are combined into the second goal in the Youth League’s
mission statement, while Seno'o’s third aim is split up into the first and
third goals in the mission statement.
Two years later, Seno'o published another book or pamphlet with the
title New Buddhism on the Way to Social Transformation 社会変革途上の
新興佛教 in which he listed six “demands of modern/contemporary
society” 現代社会の要求:




(1931), 『新興佛教への転身』, reprinted in: 稲垣真美 (ed.) (1975), 『妹尾義
郎宗教論集』 (大蔵出版): 260-301, p. 260.
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Firstly,  contemporary  science  advocates  atheism,  denying  the
reality of superhuman gods or Buddhas.
Secondly,  contemporary  science  advocates  “aspiritualism”,108
denying the doctrine of nirvāṇa that recognizes a life after death.
Thirdly,  people  nowadays  are  not  satisfied  with  fairytale-like
happiness,  but  desire  the  enjoyment  of  complete  happiness  in
actual daily life.
Fourthly,  desiring  stability  in  economic  life,  the  general  public
nowadays demands a reform of capitalism.
Fifthly, awakened mankind sublates109 nationalism and is elated
by internationalism.
Sixthly, adherents of progressive Buddhism break with sectarian
Buddhism and desire its unification.110
108 Seno'o coins a neologism here that mirrors the Japanese term for “atheism”,
which occurs in the first “demand”. “Atheism” is  mu-shin-ron 無神論 ,  “no-
God-theory”.  “Aspiritualism” (my translation of Seno'o’s neologism) is  mu-
reikon-ron 無霊魂論, “no -spirit/soul-theory”.
109 “ Sublates” translates the Japanese term for Hegel’s notion of “Aufheben”,
which shows a clear Marxist influence on Seno'o’s thought.






算してその統一を熱望する。」 妹尾義郎 (1933), 『社会変革途上の新興
佛教』, reprinted in: 稲垣真美 (ed.) (1975), 『妹尾義郎宗教論集』 (大蔵
出版): 325-388, p. 330.
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These “demands” make very clear how Seno'o and the Youth League
approached Buddhism. Their  “New Buddhism”  新興仏教 was an
atheist  Buddhism  without  gods,  spirits,  or  souls,  and  without  an
afterlife or nirvāṇa. It was a – more or less – naturalistic Buddhism with
as deep a respect for modern science as for the teachings of the Buddha.
(But note that the rejection of an afterlife follows from the adoption of
Nichiren’s  anti-dualistic  worldview  as  well  as  from  the  scientific
worldview.) Furthermore, the third to fifth demands reveal that “New
Buddhism” was also a very humanistic and ethical Buddhism, focusing
on worldly happiness and worldly suffering, on well-being and misery
(rather than on the much more abstract notion of  dukkha). This is not
really new, of course. The same relatively practical focus can be found
in the writings of many other (left-leaning) Buddhist modernizers and
engaged Buddhists.111 However, the “New Buddhist” focus on worldly
suffering also reminds of how Nichiren described the main problems of
his time: “Famine and disease rage more fiercely than ever, beggars are
everywhere in sight, and scenes of death fill out eyes”.112
111 The Chinese Anarchist (and later reformist) Buddhist Taixu also proposed a
this-worldly  Buddhism,  which  he  alternatively  called  “Buddhism  for  this
world” (or “for the human world”) 人間佛教 or “Buddhism for human life”人
生佛教 .  His aim – like Seno'o and the Youth League – was to establish a
“pure land in this world” (or “in the human world”; note that “pure land” is
effectively  synonymous  with  “Buddha  land”  here)  人 間 凈 土 .  Taixu’s
“Buddhism for this world” was Utopian and reformist more than radical or
revolutionary, however. And since the early 1980s the term has been used to
refer to “Buddhism” in support of the state and party in China. See: Ji Zhe
(2013), “Zhao Puchu and his Renjian Buddhism”,  The Eastern Buddhist 44.2:
35-58.
112 Nichiren,  Establishing the Peace of the Country.  Translation in:  Yampolsky
(1990), Selected Writings of Nichiren, p. 14.
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transcending the Lotus Sūtra
Above,  I  claimed  that  Seno'o  and  his  Youth  League  radicalized  and
transcended  Nichiren  (and  related  thinkers  and  texts),  but  while  I
mentioned similarities with Nichiren in the foregoing, I have not really
substantiated  this  claim yet.  For  that,  I  first  need  to  say  something
about an important passage in a famous letter written by Nichiren:
The true path lies in the realities of the world. The ... [Sūtra of the
golden light] states, “If one profoundly discerns secular dharmas,
that  is  precisely  the  Buddha-Dharma.”  And  the  Nirvāṇa  Sūtra
states,  “All  secular  and  external  scriptures  and  writings  are  in
each  case  the  Buddha’s  teaching.  They  are  not  heterodox
teachings.” When the Great Teacher Miao-lo ... cited the passage
from  ...  the  Lotus  Sūtra,  “All  worldly  affairs  of  livelihood  and
property in no case differ from the true aspect,” comparing it with
the other [passages cited here] and elucidating its meaning, [he
explained  that,]  although the  first  two  sūtras  have  a  profound
intent, [in comparison] they are still shallow and cannot approach
the  Lotus Sūtra. Where they explain secular dharmas in terms of
the Buddha-Dharma, this is not so of the Lotus Sūtra. It interprets
secular  dharmas  as  immediately  comprising  the  whole  of  the
Buddha-Dharma.113
Background  of  the  passage  is,  of  course,  Nichiren’s  anti-dualism:
there is just one world. But if there is just one world, there is also just
113 Nichiren, “Offerings in Principle and Actuality” (also known as “The Gift of
Rice”). Translation: Jacqueline Stone (1990),  Some Disputed Writings in the
Nichiren Corpus: Textual, Hermeneutical and Historical Problems, PhD thesis
(University of California), p. 485-486.
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one epistemology and just one science. Then, there is no fundamental
difference between Buddhist insights and scientific insights – insight is
just  insight,  and truth is  just  truth.  Thus,  secular  dharmas (theories,
teachings,  doctrines)  are  Buddhist  teachings  –  or  in  other  words,
Buddhism ought  to  incorporate  (and adjust  to)  scientific  knowledge.
(Note  that  the  Dalai  Lama,  for  example,  has  expressed  a  similar
sentiment on numerous occasions, and that, by implication, if scientific
insights change, Buddhism must change with it.114)
There  being  just  one  world  –  this  one  –  Nichiren’s  aim  was  to
establish  a  “Buddha  Land”  (i.e. a  more  less  Utopian  society  along
Buddhist lines) in this world. He observed, however, that the world he
lived in was very far removed from the ideal. The world he lived in was
one of poverty and disaster.  To the best of his knowledge the cause of all
this misery was a corruption of Buddhism, insufficient reverence of the
Lotus Sūtra by the people and state, particularly. So that needed to be
rectified.  Science and philosophy have progressed considerably since
Nichiren’s time, however, and to the best of our knowledge (or Seno'o’s
knowledge) the causes of misery are very different, and consequently,
the remedy must be different as well. Nevertheless, the starting point –
there is  one world and a Buddha Land must  be realized in that  one
world – and the general line of reasoning leading to the suggestion of a
remedy are the same.
Recall that the “Proclamation” of the Youth League stated that “the
suffering in present society is mainly caused by the capitalist economic
system”  (see  above).  Seno'o  repeatedly  made  similar  claims.  As  an
114 To what extent he really means this can be doubted, however, as he doesn’t
seem  willing  to  give  up  on  reincarnation,  substance  dualism,  and  other
supernatural beliefs.
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explanation  of  the  cause  of  misery,  this  seems  considerably  more
plausible than Nichiren’s – given all we know, it’s rather hard to believe
that a lack of reverence of the Lotus Sūtra is the cause of poverty in the
“developing” world or of the destruction of our planet’s climate system,
which is already causing massive suffering in most parts of the world,
and  which  is  even  threatening  mankind’s  survival.  That  neoliberal
capitalism is to blame for these is undeniable, on the other hand. Erik
Reinert,  Ha-Joon Chang,  and others  have  documented how capitalist
ideology has ruined the “developing” world, preventing it from really
developing.115 Mike Davis. John Rapley, and Naomi Klein have written
about  the  misery  and  suffering  resulting  from  capitalism’s  quest  to
enrich the few.116 Naomi Klein, Bill  McKibben, and many others have
shown that climate change is driven by capitalism and that the same
ideology  is  to  blame  for  the  lack  of  willingness  to  prevent  climate
change  from  becoming  catastrophic.117 And  so  on.  And  so  forth.  So,
contrary  to  Nichiren’s  diagnosis,  Seno'o’s  isn’t  far-fetched.  In  the
contrary, it seems to be spot on: capitalism is the main cause and origin
115 Erik Reinert (2007).  How Rich Countries Got Rich…and Why Poor Countries
Stay Poor (London:  Constable).  Ha-Joon Chang (2002).  Kicking away the
Ladder (London:  Anthem).  Ha-Joon Chang (2007).  Bad Samaritans:  Rich
Nations,  Poor  Policies,  and  the  Threat  to  the  Developing World (London:
Random House).
116 Mike  Davis  (2000).  Late  Victorian  Holocausts:  El  Niño  Famines  and  the
Making of the Third World (London: Verso). John Rapley (2017).  Twilight of
the Money Gods: Economics as Religion and How it All Went Wrong (London:
Simon & Schuster).  Naomi  Klein  (2007).  The  Shock Doctrine:  The Rise  of
Disaster Capitalism (New York: Henry Holt).
117 Naomi  Klein  (2014).  This  Changes  Everything:  Capitalism  vs.  the  Climate
(Knopf). Bill McKibben (2019).  Falter: Has the Human Game Begun to Play
Itself Out? (Wildfire).
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of suffering in the world.118 And therefore, to realize a “Buddha Land” in
this world, capitalism needs to be reformed or replaced.
Seno'o’s  anti-capitalist  conclusion  follows  from  premises  that  he
mostly shared with Nichiren and followed a line of reasoning that is
also identical to Nichiren’s. It is in this sense that Seno'o and the Youth
League radicalized Nichiren and the Lotus Sūtra: they took those to their
logical conclusion. But in doing so, they also transcended Nichiren and
the Lotus Sūtra. While for Nichiren the Lotus Sūtra was both the starting
point  and  end  point  of  his  argument  (it  provided  the  anti-dualist
premise and the solution/conclusion), in case of Seno'o the Lotus Sūtra
and associated ideas were more like a ladder that, once used to climb
up, can be discarded.119 That is, the Lotus Sūtra and the philosophy based
on it lead to the anti-dualist premises that there is just one world and
just one epistemology, but plays no further role beyond that. In other
words, Seno'o has left the Lotus Sūtra behind (or transcended it).
Furthermore, contrary to Nichiren who believed that the Lotus Sūtra
was the Buddha’s final and ultimate teaching, Seno'o was well aware of
the key findings  of  academic research on Buddhism of  his  time and
argued that the Lotus Sūtra and other Mahāyāna Sūtras did not literally
record  the  Buddha’s  sermons  at  all.  In  his  Turning  towards  a  New
Buddhism, Seno'o wrote that:
When the times change and social conditions and culture advance,
Buddhism  develops  as  well,  and  the  Mahāyāna  Sūtras  are  the
118 See also: Brons (2017), The Hegemony of Psychopathy.
119 This Wittgensteinian metaphor (Tractatus 6.54) is rather popular in recent
Buddhist  writings  (or  writings  about  Buddhism),  so  it  seemed  especially
appropriate to borrow it here.
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many new Sūtras  that  were produced by later  followers  of  the
Buddha in  order  to  adapt  to  the age [they lived in];  therefore,
because  the  Mahāyāna  Sūtras  are  no  direct  recordings  of  the
sermons  of  the  Buddha,  I  say  that  “Mahāyāna  is  not  the
view/doctrine of the Buddha”.120
Consequently, Seno'o’s “transcendence” of the Lotus Sūtra is not just
accident of the line of reasoning he radicalized, but also a necessity. The
Lotus Sūtra did not represent the words of the Buddha but was a later
production  that  was  appropriate  to  that later  time.  It  was  still
appropriate to Nichiren’s time according to Seno'o,121 but has mostly
lost  its  relevance  since.  Hence,  the  need  for  a  “New  Buddhism”,  a
Buddhism based equally on modern science, on the conditions of this
world, and on an interpretation of the teachings of the Buddha.
One  of  the  most  common  definitions  of  what  it  means  to  be  a
Buddhist is “one who has taken refuge in the three jewels of Buddha,
dharma, and  saṃgha”. Perhaps, unsurprisingly, Seno'o reinterprets the
three jewels as well, thereby giving us an account of what it means to be
a “New Buddhist” 新興仏教徒 . The term “saṃgha” usually refers to
the Buddhist (monastic) community (i.e. monks and nuns primarily, but
sometimes  also  including  lay  followers),  and  “dharma”  refers  to  the
Buddha’s  teachings  (or  to  Buddhist  teachings  more  broadly).  Seno'o
reinterprets both terms in a way consistent with his philosophy, but
120 My translation. 「佛教も、時代が進移し世態文化が進歩するにつれて発
展して、時代に適応すべく幾多の新しき経典が後来の佛弟子によって
創作されたのが大乗経典で、従って、大乗経典は直接佛陀の説法記録
でないから「大乗非佛説」といふのだ。」 妹尾義郎 (1931), 『新興佛教
への転身』, p. 265-6.
121 Idem, pp. 266-268.
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also  changes  the  order  of  the  three  jewels,  albeit  mostly  for  an
expository purpose.
The  third  jewel,  the  vow  to  take  refuge  in  the  saṃgha,  “is  the
creed/principle  of  the  realization  of  a  cooperative  society  without
exploitation”.122 Seno'o  defends  his  interpretation  of  “saṃgha”  by
arguing that the original community of the Buddha’s followers was –
more or less – this kind of society. Hence, he interpreted the term not
so much as referring to the religious or monastic aspect of the original
saṃgha, but as referring to its social aspect.
The second, the refuge in the dharma, “is the fundamental philosophy
of the realization of a cooperative society”. Seno'o adds that “‘Dharma’
does not so much refer to contemplations on emptiness or [the doctrine
of] dependent origination as to the denial of private property and the
practical  “muga-ism”  (selflessness)  of  mutual  dependence”.123 This
reinterpretation of  dharma as incorporating  all relevant knowledge or
doctrine  is  in  line  with  the  rejection  of  a  dualism  of  worlds  and
epistemologies already explained above: the secular dharma is part of
the Buddhist dharma (and the other way around). A new term here is
“muga-ism” (although this is by no means the first occurrence of the
term or variant terms in Seno'o’s writings). “Muga” means something
like “selflessness”, but is also the Japanese translation of the Buddhist
term “anātman” or “no-self”, referring to the key Buddhist teaching that
the self is an illusion or that there is no (essential, stable, unchanging)
122 My translation. 「 第三の「自帰依僧」は搾取なき共同社会実現の信条で
ある。」 妹尾義郎 (1933), 『社会変革途上の新興佛教』, p. 387.
123 My translation. 「第二の「自帰依法」は、共同社会実現の基礎哲学であ
る。法とはいうまでもなく空観 縁起のそれで、私有否定、相依相関・
の実践的無我イズムだ。」 Idem.
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self. Seno'o used the term “muga-ism” mainly as an apparent antonym
to selfishness or egoism.
The  first  jewel,  the  refuge  in  the  Buddha,  “is  the  reverence  of
Śākyamuni Buddha as the ideal experiencer and guide of the second and
third [refuges]”, recognizing that “there is no need for abstract, ideal
Buddhas like Amida Buddha, Dainichi Buddha, or the eternal Buddha as
idealizations of Śākyamuni Buddha”.124 While the other two refuges as
well  as  the  first  five  of  the  six  “demands  of  modern/contemporary
society”  may  suggest  that  Seno'o  had  transcended  (or  left  behind)
Buddhism altogether,  his  interpretation of  the refuge  in  the Buddha
shows that  this  is  not the case.  Seno'o’s  “New Buddhism” may have
been  unconventional  in  several  ways  –  it  was  atheist,  humanist,
socialist, ethical, and perhaps even secular or naturalist – but he was
still very much a Buddhist. The Buddha remained his first refuge.
Furthermore,  while  it  can  be  argued  that  Seno'o  attempted  to
secularize  Buddhism,  he  simultaneously  “Buddhified”  secularity.  The
term “muga-ism” is a good example hereof. Superficially, it may seem to
be just a secular term denoting an antonym to selfishness or egoism,
but it is very unlikely that it is a mere coincidence that muga 無我 also
means  no-self (anātman).125 According  to  Mahāyāna  texts  about
bodhicitta (becoming  a  Bodhisattva)  such  as  Śāntideva’s




125 And the  reference  to  mutual  dependence,  which  is  another  important
Buddhist notion (albeit mainly a metaphysical one), in the same phrase is
probably no coincidence either.
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Bodhicaryāvatāra, the selfless compassion (or  muga-ism?) that more or
less defines Bodhisattvas is inseparable from a deep understanding of
no-self  (muga,  anātman)  –  that  is,  one  cannot  have  one  without  the
other: the wisdom of no-self requires genuine compassion and loving-
kindness  and  the  other  way  around.  And  this  strongly  suggest  that
Seno'o’s  normative  ideal  (on  the  individual  rather  than  the  social
level126) of  muga-ism is a variant of the Bodhisattva ideal – a genuine
muga-ist is a Bodhisattva.
126 On the social level, the ideal is a “Buddha Land” in this world.
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concluding remarks
One may wonder whether Seno'o’s transcendence of Nichiren and the
Lotus  Sūtra,  taken  to  its  logical  conclusion,  doesn’t  lead  to  a
transcendence  of  Buddhism as  well  –  that  is,  to  some  kind  of  post-
Buddhist socialism that has sprouted from the Buddhist tree, but is no
longer  a  part  of  it.  As  mentioned,  Seno'o  remained  committed  to
Buddhism  –  he  believed  that  socialism  by  itself  is  too  cold  and
materialistic  and  that  Buddhism  is  needed  to  add  what  socialism  is
missing.  However,  the  secularized  “New Buddhism”  he  advocated  is
subject  to  the  very  same  friction  between  secularity  and  Buddhism
mentioned above in the context of Batchelor’s “secular Buddhism” and
related secularized Western Buddhisms. A consistent secularity trumps
Buddhism,  meaning  that  if  secular  science  proves  (some  aspect  of)
Buddhism wrong, it is (that aspect of) Buddhism that has to go. Perhaps,
this  is  less  of  a  problem  for  Seno'o  than  for  Batchelor  and  fellow
travelers, however. Seno'o was quite explicit that Buddhism needs to
change with the time, that it needs to adapt and evolve into whatever is
appropriate for the age. And if one doesn’t cling to some kind of fixed
core  or  essence  of  Buddhism  (which  would  be  very  un-Buddhist
anyway), then Buddhism may be almost infinitely adaptable. A secular
challenge to Buddhism, then, wouldn’t necessary result in a rejection of
Buddhism  (if  one  would  be  consistently  secular),  but  would  merely
force a rethinking and adaptation.
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A much more fundamental difference between Batchelor’s and other
Western Buddhists’ secular Buddhism(s) and Seno'o’s “New Buddhism”
concerns aims and purpose. To some extent, both confront the distress
and suffering caused by modern capitalist society, but while Batchelor’s
secular Buddhism (even though he explicitly denies it) merely aims at
helping people to cope with that distress, Seno'o’s goal is too abolish
the  underlying  cause  of  all  that  misery  –  that  is,  capitalism  –  and
establish  a  “Buddha  Land”  (i.e. a  more  or  less  ideal  society  with
significantly less suffering) in this world.
In  the  end,  all  that  that  “secular  Buddhism”  (and  other  Western
Buddhisms127) has to offer is peace of mind. But what good is (my) peace
of mind while billions suffer? While millions of children die of hunger,
thirst,  and preventable diseases? While climate change slowly makes
ever larger swaths of our planet uninhabitable for humans and other
animals? While even in rich countries a very large proportion of the
population suffers from insecurity, stress, and/or depression?
The proclamation read in the first  meeting (1931)  of  Seno'o’s New
Buddhist  Youth  League  starts  with  the  following  rather  pertinent
observations:
This is an era of suffering. Fellow men desire love and trust, but
are forced to engage in conflict, while the general public wishes
for bread, but is only fed oppression. Either if one [tries to] escape
or [engages in] conflict, the present world is fluctuating between
chaos and distress.
127 And probably also many other popular Buddhisms.
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In such an age, what are Buddhists aware of, and what are they
contributing to society? Intoxicated by [their own] cheap peace of
mind, most Buddhists do not see a problem.128
The term “intoxication” 陶酔 is appropriate here. Peace of mind is
like a drug suppressing pain, stress, and/or anxiety. But while, on the
one hand, it is understandable that many people desire such a “drug”,
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  something  rather  disturbing  about  the
pursuit of a “drug” that ultimately aims at closing one’s eyes for the
suffering of the world. I can understand why people would desire peace
of mind, but if you’re able to actually achieve peace of mind in this world
– and thus, in a sense, to make peace  with this world – then there is
something seriously wrong with you, even if what is wrong with you
has gradually come to be seen as normal. This is an age of narcissism or
cultural psychopathy – being self-centered and callous has become the
norm.129 While  this  makes  the  selfish pursuit  of  peace  of  mind very
fashionable (and thus, in some sense “secular”), I also find it more than
a  little  repulsive.  Furthermore,  it  conflicts  with  my  –  admittedly
somewhat idiosyncratic – views of what Buddhism is about.
Perhaps, like all other religions, lay Buddhism has rarely been much
more  than  a  tool  to  repress  fear  and  anxiety  (the  fear  of  death,




数仏教徒は問題とすまい。」 新興仏教青年同盟 (New Buddhist Youth
League) (1931), 『宣言』 (Proclamation), p. 3.
129 See: Twenge & Campbell (2009), The Narcissism Epidemic, and: Brons (2017),
The Hegemony of Psychopathy.
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particularly130), but this doesn’t mean that this use and role of a religion
determines its nature. One could use a book to balance a wobbly table,
but that doesn’t mean it’s no longer a book. To understand the book as
book, one has to look beyond its role and use as table-stabilizer, and
open it and look inside. Similarly, to understand any body of thought,
one has to look beyond its practical roles and uses and look “inside”.
And when one looks “inside”, then the idea of Buddhism as a tool to
provide peace of mind quickly becomes ludicrous.131
Take  Buddhaghosa  as  an  example.  In  his  extremely  influential
Visuddhimagga he argues (among others) that everyone should meditate
on death and loving-kindness (or compassion132).  The purpose of  the
meditation of death is to experience a state of  shock helping one to
understand the real nature of suffering.133 (Śāntideva makes a closely
related point in  Bodhicaryāvatāra 6:21.) The purpose of the meditation
on loving-kindness or  compassion is  to  (come to)  care  about  others’
suffering and well-being like it is one’s own. This is not some fringe idea
of a single, isolated Buddhist monk – rather, this is part of the shared
core  of  almost  all  schools  and  currents  of  Buddhism.  The  point  of
Buddhism is not to make peace with the suffering in this world, but to
dissolve the selfish focus on one’s own suffering and happiness and to
make all suffering one’s own. (Or that’s part of the point, at least.)
130 See: Becker (1973). The Denial of Death.
131 Nevertheless, peace of mind and other advantages have always been part
of the sales pitch of Buddhism, but it is never a good idea to confuse a sales
pitch with the real thing.
132 The term mettā is usually translated as “loving-kindess”, but is very close to
the modern understanding of “compassion”.
133 See: Brons (2016). “Facing Death from a Safe Distance”.
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There is an important distinction with regards to human responses to
the suffering of others between empathic distress and empathic concern.134
The former is characterized by a sense of distress when witnessing the
suffering others and leads to a desire to no longer witness that suffering
– that is, to closing one’s eyes (and heart), to escape (or escapism), and
so forth. The second is also associated with a kind of distress but leads
to genuine (altruistic) concern for the other and a desire for the other’s
suffering  to  end  or  be  alleviated  instead  –  “empathic  concern”  is  a
synonym  of  “compassion”.  Buddhism  aims  at  strengthening  and
promoting empathic concern, not at escaping empathic distress. Aiming
for  one’s  own peace  of  mind  in  this  world  does  the  exact  opposite.
Consequently, I cannot see so-called “Buddhisms” that are little more
than tools  to  achieve  peace  of  mind as  anything but  perversions  or
corruptions. (And one of the reasons why it is unlikely that I'd ever call
myself a Buddhist is – paradoxically, perhaps – that I don’t want to be
associated with such fashionable perversions.135)
All that secular Buddhism has to offer is peace of mind, 136 but I don’t
want peace of mind – I want a revolution.
134 C.  Daniel  Batson  (2009).  “The  Things  Called  Empathy:  Eight  Related  but
Distinct Phenomena”, in: Jean Decety & William John Ickes (eds.), The Social
Neuroscience of Empathy (Cambridge MA: MIT Press): 3–15.
135 This in addition to the fact that I only provisionally accept some aspects of
Buddhist  thought,  which  conflicts  with  the  common  essentialist
understanding of religious identification. See the section titled “the secular
and the religious”.
136 Probably the same is true for most other Western Buddhisms and even for
most non-Western (lay) Buddhisms. However, by emptying out Buddhism of
almost all other “content”, secular Buddhism has made peace of mind the
prime (or even sole) purpose of “Buddhism”.
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